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Preface
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mutual co-operation. This thesis comprises of three research studies un-
dertaken on three important topics of political economics. The first paper
(chapter 2) “Bread and the attrition of power: Economic events and German
election results” examines the German’s voting behavior in the post–war pe-
riod. The second paper (chapter 3)“Pakistan, Politics and Political Business
Cycles” relates to the Pakistan’s experience in terms of politics, economics
and political business cycles. The third paper (chapter 4) “Pakistan Central
Bank Independence and Electoral Politics” examines the Pakistan central
bank independence and existence of political monetary cycles.
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Abstract
This thesis comprises of three research studies undertaken on three impor-
tant topics of political economics. The first paper (chapter 2) “Bread and
the attrition of power: Economic events and German election results” has
analyzed the German’s voting behavior in response to the economic situa-
tions prevailing during the postwar period 1953-2005. This paper has been
a modified and extended version of the Hibbs “Bread and Peace Model”
and result shows that real per capita disposable income growth is the only
economic variable that explains the incumbent aggregate vote share in Ger-
many. The second paper (chapter 3) “Pakistan, Politics and Political Busi-
ness Cycles” relates to Pakistan’s experience in terms of politics, economics
and political business cycles. This paper investigates the presence of polit-
ical business cycles in various macroeconomic indicators during the period
1973–2009. The third paper (chapter 4) “Pakistan Central Bank Indepen-
dence and Electoral Politics” examines the existence of political monetary
cycles in Pakistan, keeping in view the independence of the State Bank of
Pakistan. Each of these three chapters is a self-contained unit, provides em-
pirical evidence enriched with modern sophisticated econometric techniques
and provides useful policy implications. Although the substance uncovered
in the three chapters is different to each other, but they are all based on
the common concept of “economic voting” and its implications on economy,
politics and other institutions.
Chapter two studies the German’s voting behavior in response to eco-
nomic situations prevailing during the period 1953–2005. Empirical results
suggest that German voters are backward-looking and they consider the
whole legislative term with only small discounting of past events. They are
concerned about national economic well-being, vote according to the per
capita real disposable income growth of the economy. As in Hibbs (2008)
for the United States, we find that the aggregate votes for incumbent parties
in post-war Germany were determined by the weighted-average growth of
iii
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real per capita disposable income. Each percentage point of per capita real
disposable income growth sustained over the legislative term yielded ap-
proximately two percentage points of votes in Germany. No other economic
variables add value or significantly perturb the coefficients of our model.
However, attrition of power is turned out to be another important variable
in the case of Germany that has reduced the vote share in election years
1961, 1994 and 1998.
Chapter three focuses on the opportunistic politicians’ behavior in terms
of manipulation of the macroeconomic indicators during the election pe-
riod. Research study has been carried out to study whether in Pakistan
the dynamic behavior of unemployment, inflation, budget deficit and real
GDP growth is systematically affected by the timing of elections. We have
covered the period from 1973–2009 that comprises of seven election terms.
Auto Regressive Moving Average (ARMA) Model and Auto Regressive In-
tegrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models with political dummies have
been used to investigate the presence of political business cycles in Pak-
istan. Results show that unemployment tends to be lower in pre-election
periods and tends to increase immediately after elections, perhaps as a result
of politically motivated employment schemes. Inflation tends to be lower
in pre-election periods, perhaps as a result of pre-electoral price regulation.
Similarly we find an increase in the governmental budget deficit financed
by heavy government borrowings from the central bank and banking sector
during the election year. However, real GDP growth and real governmental
investment growth declines during pre and post election years, may be as a
result of inefficient resource allocation.
Chapter four attempts to examine the Pakistan’s central bank inde-
pendence and the existence of political monetary cycles (PMC) during the
period 1985–2010. Existence of such cycles demonstrate the opportunistic
political behavior as well as the non-independence of central bank in its
monetary operations. Despite various amendments that have been made
to strengthen the autonomy of Pakistan’s central bank during the decade
1990s, it has been witnessed that Pakistan’s central bank is still among the
list of least independent central banks. The same picture has been exhib-
ited by the rising fiscal deficit and deficit financing trend during the period
1985–2010. Considering this status, one may suspect the existence of po-
litical monetary cycles in Pakistan. Using quarterly data for the period
1985Q1–2010Q4, we have estimated the central bank monetary policy reac-
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tion function. Empirical results allow us to conclude that whenever there
is an increase in the real output gap or real GDP growth and inflationary
pressures in the economy, the central bank tightens its monetary policy by
raising the discount rate. To test the existence of political monetary cycles,
we have introduced some political dummies in the estimated baseline mod-
els. Pre-election political dummies are found to be negative and significant,
accepting the PMC hypothesis that the central bank facilitates the incum-
bent parties in the run up to election by reducing the interest rate during
the underlying study period in Pakistan.
v
Kurzfassung
Diese Arbeit besteht aus drei Studien zu jeweils einem wichtigen Thema aus
dem Bereich der politischen O¨konomie. Das erste Forschungsthema “Brot
und Machtverfall: Volkswirtschaftliche Ergebnisse und Deutsche Wahlergeb-
nisse” analysiert das Wahlverhalten der Deutschen als Reaktion auf die
eigene wirtschaftliche Situation in den Jahren 1953 bis 2005 und ist in
“Public Choice” (2009) VR. 141, S. 151 – 169 vero¨ffentlicht. Diese Studie
ist eine modifizierte und erweiterte Version des “Brot- und Friedensmod-
ells” von Hibbs und die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass das Wachstum des real
verfu¨gbaren Pro-Kopf-Einkommens die einzige o¨konomische Variable ist, die
den Stimmenanteil der bis dato regierenden Partei bzw. Koalition erkla¨rt.
Die zweite Studie (Kapitel 3) “Pakistan, Politik und politische Konjunk-
turzyklen” bezieht sich auf die pakistanische Erfahrung in Bezug auf Poli-
tik, Wirtschaft und politische Konjunkturzyklen. Es wird die Pra¨senz von
politischen Konjunkturzyklen in Hinsicht auf verschiedene makroo¨konomis-
che Indikatoren im Zeitraum von 1973 bis 2009 untersucht. Der dritte
Beitrag (Kapitel 4) “Pakistan die Unabha¨ngigkeit der Zentralbank und par-
lamentarische Politik” untersucht die Existenz von politischen moneta¨ren
Kreisla¨ufen in Pakistan in Hinblick auf die Unabha¨ngigkeit der Zentralbank
of Pakistan. Jedes dieser drei Kapitel ist eine in sich geschlossene Ein-
heit, liefert empirische Beweise anhand moderner o¨konometrischer Metho-
den und liefert hilfreiche politische Implikationen.Obwohl die Kapitel un-
terschiedliche inhaltliche Schwerpunkte setzen, beziehen sich alle auf das
Konzept von demokratisher Abstimmungen und deren Auswirkungen auf
Wirtschaft, Politik und andere Institutionen.
Kapitel 2 untersucht das deutsche Wahlverhalten in Reaktion auf die
wirtschaftlichen Situationen wa¨hrend des Zeitraums 1953 bis 2005. Em-
pirische Ergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass Wa¨hler in Deutschland eine
gesamte Legislaturperiode ru¨ckblickend und dabei nur schwach distanzierend
bewerten. Sie sind besorgt u¨ber ihr eigenes wirtschaftliches Wohlerge-
vi
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hen, sodass sie auf Basis des real verfu¨gbaren Pro-Kopf-Einkommens der
Volkswirtschaft abstimmen. Genauso wie Hibbs (2008) fu¨r die Vereinigten
Staaten herausfand, konnte auch fu¨r die etablierten Parteien im Nachkriegs-
deutschland eine Stimmenabha¨ngigkeit vom durchschnittlichen Wachstum
des realen Pro-Kopf-Einkommens bestimmt werden. Jeder Prozentpunkt
des Pro-Kopf-Wachstums des verfu¨gbaren Realeinkommens in einer Legis-
laturperiode, ergab nachhaltig rund zwei Prozentpunkte mehr der Stimmen
in Deutschland. Keine andere o¨konomische Variable sto¨rt oder schwa¨cht
die Aussagekraft der Koeffizienten des Modells signifikant. Allerdings stellt
der Machtverfall eine weitere wichtige Variable in Deutschland dar, welche
sich negativ auf die Stimmvergabe in den Wahljahren 1961, 1994 und 1998
auswirkte.
Kapitel 3 konzentriert sich auf das Verhalten von opportunistischen
Politikern in Bezug auf die Manipulation der makro-o¨konomischen Indika-
toren. Dieser Forschungsbeitrag ist durchgefu¨hrt worden um zu untersuchen
ob in Pakistan das dynamische Verhalten von Arbeitslosigkeit, Inflation,
Haushaltsdefizit und dem realen BIP-Wachstum systematisch durch den
Zeitpunkt der Wahlen beeinflusst wird. Wir haben den Zeitraum von 1973
bis 2009 abgedeckt, der sieben Wahlzyklen umfasst. Das Auto Regressive
Moving Average (ARMA) Modell und das Auto Regressive Integrated Mov-
ing Average (ARIMA) Modell mit politischen Dummys wurde verwendet,
um das Vorhandensein von politischen Konjunkturzyklen in Pakistan zu
untersuchen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Arbeitslosigkeit tendenziell
in Wahlkampfzeiten niedriger ist und dazu neigt, sofort nach den Wahlen
zu steigen, vielleicht als Folge der politisch motivierten Bescha¨ftigungspro-
gramme. Die Inflation ist in Wahlkampfzeiten tendenziell niedriger, vielle-
icht als Folge der im Vorfeld der Wahlen stattfindenden Preisregulierung.
Ebenso finnden wir eine Erho¨hung des staatlichen Haushaltsdefizits durch
eine massive Kreditaufnahme bei der Zentralbank und des Bankensektors
im Wahljahr. Doch das reale BIP-Wachstum und das reale staatliche In-
vestitionswachstum sinkt wa¨hrend der Pre- und Post-Wahljahre, was als
Ergebnis einer ineffizienten Ressourcenallokation gewertet werden kann.
Kapitel 4 versucht zu begutachten, wie sich die Unabha¨ngigkeit der Zen-
tralbank in Pakistan und die Existenz von politischen moneta¨ren Zyklen
(PMC) im Zeitraum von 1985 bis 2010 darstellt. Die Existenz solcher
Zyklen deutet auf opportunistisches politisches Verhalten sowie die Nicht-
Unabha¨ngigkeit der Zentralbank bei ihren geldpolitischen Operationen hin.
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Trotz verschiedener A¨nderungen, die gemacht wurden um die Autonomie
der Zentralbank Pakistans in der Dekade der 1990er Jahre zu sta¨rken,
ist zu beobachten, dass Pakistans Zentralbank noch auf der Liste der am
wenigsten unabha¨ngigen Zentralbanken zu finden ist. Das gleiche Bild
ergibt sich durch das steigende Haushaltsdefizit und den Trend der De-
fizitfinanzierung wa¨hrend der Zeit von 1985 bis 2010. Angesichts dieses
Status kann man vermuten, dass politische moneta¨re Zyklen in Pakistan
existieren. Mit viertelja¨hrlichen Daten fu¨r den Zeitraum 1. Quartal 1985
bis 4. Quartal 2010, haben wir die geldpolitische Reaktionsfunktion der
Zentralbank gescha¨tzt. Empirische Ergebnisse bringen uns zu dem Schluss,
dass, wenn es zu einer Erho¨hung der realen Output-Lu¨cke, des realen BIP-
Wachstums und dem Inflationsdruck in der Volkswirtschaft kommt, die
Zentralbank ihre Geldpolitik durch die Erho¨hung des Zinssatzes verscha¨rft.
Um die Existenz von politischen moneta¨ren Zyklen zu testen, haben wir
einige politische Dummys in die gescha¨tzten Basis-Modelle eingefu¨hrt. Poli-
tische Dummys bei Vorwahlen erwiesen sich als negativ und signifikant,
was zu der Annahme der PMC Hypothese, dass die Zentralbank in Pak-
istan die Regierungsparteien im Vorfeld der Wahlen durch Verringerung
des Zinssatzes unterstu¨tzt, fu¨hrt.
viii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
When you think economics, think elections; When you think
elections, think economics (Tufte 1978, 65).
1
Chapter 1 Introduction
This dissertation aims at studying two lines of research prominent in
political economics; one relates to economic voting, other relates to elec-
toral politics and political business cycles. The notion “Economics shape
politics”, is well worn among the politicians, policymakers and scholars.
Electorates who consider politicians are responsible and accountable for
their economic well-being, will act upon the reward-and-punishment model.
They reward the incumbents by voting them in good times, and punish
them by voting against them in bad times. If this exists, then there exists
a motivation among the politicians for electoral manipulation of macroe-
conomics or political business cycles. Since politicians are not the social
planners, their main objective is to fulfill their political motives e.g. re-
election or remain in office. This opportunistic short-term vision led them
to select those set of policies that maximize their short term motives, irre-
spective of the fact that these opportunistic policies such as electoral cycles
are harmful in any case and have serious implications for economies in the
long run.
For example the emergence and persistence of large public-sector budget
deficits and the resulting monetary expansion to create a short-term eco-
nomic boom before or during the election timings may create inflationary
bias and debt sustainability issues. To control and avoid these opportunis-
tic political pressures, the establishment of independent, transparent, strong
and legalized institutional setups are strongly recommended worldwide. In
this context, a brief introduction of the historical evolution of the concept
of voting behavior, economic voting and its implications on economy and
political business cycles is worthwhile.
1.1 Voting Behavior
The research on voting dates back to the 1920s, when social scientists began
to become more empirically oriented (Merriam and Gosnell,1924). Some
of the earliest works analyzed voting patterns by geographical areas and
sociological attributes e.g. regions, states, racial origin, ethnic urbanization
and class lines.
Research on voting behavior was revolutionized with the advent of sur-
vey research, starting with academic surveys in the 1920s and surveys by
commercial polling firms in 1930s. The survey method shifted the focus
from the collection of sociological variables to the measurement of atti-
2
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tudes. Statistical analysis of these data yields a powerful prediction of the
individual’s vote. The national vote can vary considerably from one election
to the next, but the socio-graphic variables are too stable to explain such
changes as they are long run. Attitudes towards political objects, on the
other hand, are short in nature. They can, and do, change between elec-
tions enough to account for the large changes that sometimes occur in the
vote. Additionally these attitudinal variables yield a much more political
understanding of elections than do socio-demographic variables.
Lewis-Beck identify a number of factors that form a causation for the vot-
ing behavior. These are as follows: (1) political interest; (2) economic issues;
(3) fear of war; (4) religious convictions; (5) cost of education; (6) leadership;
(7) social pressures; (8) family concerns; and (9) ethnicity (Lewis-Beck,et
al., 2007).
To understand the causal relationship between factors that lead to cer-
tain voting behavior, (Converse, 2006) describes it as a funnel. The picture
of a funnel is a useful way to think about the causal process (see Figure
1.1). The main axis of funnel is the time dimension, with events following
one another over time from the mouth of the funnel to its tip. There are a
multitude of potential causes at the mouth, and they narrow down to cause
vote turnout and vote direction in a particular election at the tip.
Government effect  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Socio-Demographics 
Party Identification 
Issues 
Candidates 
Time 
VOTE 
Figure 1.1: Funnel of Causality Model [ (Lewis-Beck,et al., 2007), p.23].
The good feature associated with the funnel of causality model is that it
provides an appropriate organizing framework that can encompasses all of
the factors that includes, from long term sociological, psychological, histor-
ical institutional and geographic factors to short-term social psychological,
political psychological, economic, and communication factors. However,
Lewis-Beck suggest one has to pay attention to more than just time dimen-
sion while working on the development of a theory of voting behavior. These
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are as follows: First, it is necessary to distinguish between relevant and ir-
relevant factors. Second, one has to distinguish between factors of which a
person is aware of (personal condition) and those of which he or she is not
aware of (external conditions). Third, one has to distinguish between polit-
ical and non-political conditions. It is important to recognize that external
non-political events can become personal and political by the time of the
election. Nonpolitical events become political through a “Political Transla-
tion Process”[ (Lewis-Beck,et al., 2007), p.23]. For example, the state of the
economy becomes a political factor through a political translation process,
when political parties politicize the economic news.
There are a number of approaches developed to understand the under-
lying mechanism of the voting behavior. One in particular, the rational-
choice approach, was developed in 1920s [ (Lewis-Beck,et al., 2007), p.27].
The general rational-choice approach explains voting in terms of a person’s
self interest. Whether or not a person vote depends on that person’s cost-
benefit analysis: the potential gains from his or her preferred candidate
being elected; and the costs they must pay to vote, the time involved in
registering and voting, gathering information about the election, and so
on. According to the rational-choice approach, a person votes for a party
that belongs to the same ideological position as the voter’s. The rational-
choice approach has over time become closely identified with the idea of
economic voting. Indeed, the approach evolved from economics, and vot-
ing for one’s self interest is seen as rational. This assumption has led to
considerable attention to the macroeconomic state of the economy as the
election approaches, as well as to the effect of individual economic situations
on decisions-for example, whether the unemployed are more likely to vote,
or whether those whose economic status is slipping are more likely to vote
against the incumbent party.
In addition to rational choice, Lewis-Beck also identified sociological and
historical-institutional approaches are described as follows: A sociological
approach focuses on the social group correlates of voting, while a psycholog-
ical approach focuses on the effect of personality factors, such as whether
voters with authoritarian tendencies are more likely to favor a particular
party. There is also a historical-institutional approach which emphasizes
the effects of historical changes and voting laws; and there is political psy-
chology, which applies insights derived from modern cognitive psychology.
Our main focus in this dissertation is on economic voting and its implica-
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tions on macroeconomics and institutional arrangements setups.
1.1.1 Economic Voting Theory
The notion that economics matters for elections has considerable cachet all
over the world. The core model behind the idea that an incumbent won or
lost an election because of the economy is the reward–punishment model.
The incumbent receives the reward of a vote for good economic times, and
punishment for bad economic times by voting for the opposition (Kiewiet,
1983).
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Figure 1.2: A Diagram of Economic Voting [Lewis-Beck (1988), p.93].
Empirical studies of systematic connections of voting and the macroe-
conomy began to appear in the mid-1920s, however the landmark event in
the modern history of research on macroeconomic conditions and elections
outcomes is Gerald Kramer’s 1971 article on US voting behavior [Kramer
(1971)]. Kramer’s work was inspired by the broader framework set out by
Anthony Downs in “An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957)” – by far
the most important work on the political economy of electoral democra-
cies published in the twentieth century. Kramer proposed a clear model for
macroeconomic voting, and its empirical predictions were subject to formal
econometric tests. Kramer viewed parties as alternative governing teams.
Voters were presumed to be rational, self-interested and future-oriented ac-
tors for whom acquiring and analyzing massive amounts of potentially rel-
evant information was costly and impractical. Instead he assumed that
voters adopt a simple, efficient decision rule: if the incumbent’s perfor-
mance is “satisfactory” vote to retain the incumbent party; if not, vote for
the opposition. Kramer’s regression experiments showed that the growth of
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per capita real personal income exerted robust positive effects on aggregate
voting outcomes from 1896 to 1964. In the presence of real income growth
rates, inflation and changes in unemployment appeared to have little or
no electoral importance – a result that by and large has been sustained
over a generation of subsequent empirical research. However Hibbs iden-
tified a number of shortcomings identified as follows: (1) he did not sup-
ply any evidence that the stochastic properties of macroeconomic variables
supported the assumption that the best forecast of future innovation to in-
flation and real income growth was current growth rates, or that the best
forecast of innovation to unemployment was current changes in the rate;
(2) he did not attempt to test the supporting assumption that economic
voting was forward-looking (prospective), as opposed to being purely retro-
spective, with past performance yielding electoral rewards and punishments
regardless of the implications of past outcomes for the future; (3) further-
more, he did not provide any mechanism to map the behavior of individual,
self-interested voters applying simple decision rules to the aggregate vote
shares populating his regression experiments [Hibbs (2006), p.565].
The second major event in the emergence of sophisticated empirical
analysis of voting and the macroeconomy is Ray Fair’s 1978 article on eco-
nomic voting for US presidents [Fair (1978)]. Like Kramer, Fair adopted
the Downsian environment of rational, self-interested voters whose elec-
toral behavior is driven by maximization of expected future utility under
the available political alternatives. Fair experimented with various com-
binations of within-term macroeconomic outcomes and outcomes observed
during previous administrations of both the current incumbents and current
opposition parties, and he concluded that only within-term macroeconomic
conditions affected voting. Fair revised his equation sequentially from one
presidential election to the next in a quite openly ad hoc fashion, and from
the start offered no explanation of how the various statistically significant,
pre-election output growth and inflation variables in his regression could
rationally be informative about voter’s “highest expected future utility”.
Perhaps Fair’s most enduring contribution to applied macroeconomic vot-
ing theory was spelling out the strong assumptions necessary to get from
individual utility maximizing voters to a linear aggregate voting equation.
Fair’s derivation may be described as follows [Hibbs (2006), p.568]. Let
U Iit denote voter i’s expected future utility under the incumbent party (po-
litical bloc) at election period t, and let UOit be the corresponding expected
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utility under the opposition party (political bloc). Let Vit equal 1.0 if voter i
votes for the incumbent, and equal to 0.0 otherwise. Utilities are determined
by linear equations of the form:
U Iit = Xtb+ v
I
it
UOit = Xb+ v
O
it
Cov(X, vI,O) = 0
(1.1)
where Xt denotes a matrix of variables observed at periods during the in-
cumbent’s tenure, X is a matrix of constants (the implicit standards against
which the incumbent is evaluated), b is the associated vector of parameters,
and vI,Oit are random events affecting utilities at each election that are unob-
served by the investigator. X, X, and b are common to voters. Individuals
voting choices are determined by the party/candidate delivering the highest
utility:
Vit =
1, if U Iit  UOit0, if U Iit ≺ UOit . (1.2)
Letting vit = (v
O
it − vIit), the probability P of observing a vote for the
incumbent is therefore,
P (Vit = 1) = P [(Xt −X)b]  vit
= Ft[(Xt −X)b
(1.3)
where Ft is the cumulative distribution function of vi at any election.
Linearity of an aggregate voting equation is achieved by assuming the devi-
ations v˜i = (vi|t− vt) to be evenly distributed across voters at each election
between some constants, say d < 0 and d > 0, with uniform probabil-
ity density ft(v˜i) =
1
d−d and associated cumulative distribution function
Ft(v˜i) =
v˜i−d
d−d . The vote probabilities are then:
P (Vit = 1) =
−d+ (Xt −X)b− vt
(d− d) . (1.4)
Taking average over N voters (with N large enough to approximate an
“infinity” of votes) to find 1
N
∑N
i=1 Vit = Vt, yields the aggregate, linear
voting function most commonly used in the empirical analysis:
Vt = a+Xtβ + µt (1.5)
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where a = −d−Xb
d−d , β =
b
d−d , µt = − vtd−d ∼ white noise. Note that if
the upper and lower bounds of the distribution of electoral shocks are equal
in absolute value, i.e. d = −d, then the effects of (Xt − X) would yield
deviations of Vt from an expected vote share of 1/2.
1.1.2 Two Views of Economic Voting
Economic voting naturally divided into two main views defined by the vot-
ers’ time horizons: retrospective and the prospective. Retrospective eco-
nomic voting theory derives from Key’s (1968, 61) argument that elections
are referenda on the government party’s performance in office. Voters re-
ward “good” performance and punish “bad” performance. According to
this approach, the elector acts as a appraiser of the past events, the past
performance, and the past elections. Voters are assumed to focus on fact,
and not on fantasy. That is, they judge what the incumbent party has ac-
complished, and not what it promises to accomplish. Thus votes are cast
on the basis of economic performance, rather than economic policy propos-
als. This makes the standard for rational voter choice more realistic. For
instance with regard to the unemployment or inflation problem, the citizen
does not need to decide whether the proper strategy is public spending, job
retaining, tax incentives, or whatever. He or she merely needs to make a
judgment about whether unemployment has been at an acceptable level. If
the answer is “no”, chances for pro-incumbent vote go down. Such voting
bodes well for the democratic process, because it means that politicians who
do not deliver valued results are held accountable at election time.
According to Downs (1957), prospective economic voting is a theory
where the expected future relative performance of contestants for office is
all that matters for voters. Prospective valuation is akin to the pricing of
financial assets in efficient markets: the parties’ stock of votes at elections
(current asset values) is determined completely by the rationally formed
expectations of future benefits, calibrated in units of voter utility. Hence
electoral choice is a political investment in the future to which a party’s
(candidate’s political bloc’s) past performance has no relevance. As Downs
expressed it: “Each citizen votes for the party he believes will provide him
with higher utility than any other party during the coming electoral pe-
riod”[Downs (1957), 38].
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1.1.3 Economic Voting: Empirical Implementation
A fairly general model encompassing both prospective and retrospective
voting motivations is defined in [ Hibbs (2006), p.571] as follows:
Vt = a+ Et
(
K∑
k=1
T∑
j=1
φkjXk,t+j
)
+
K∑
k=1
T−1∑
j=0
µkjXk,t−j + ut (1.6)
where Et denotes expectations conditioned on voters’ time t informa-
tion set1. φk = 0 yields pure retrospective voting; µk = 0 implies that
voting is purely prospective. For Equation (1.6) to be operational we need
to constrain the lag and lead parameters. The natural assumption for the
prospective component is to impose a present discounted value with a con-
stant rate of time preference. The general model is
Vt = a+ Et
(
K∑
k=1
T∑
j=1
φkδ
jXk,t+j
)
+
K∑
k=1
T−1∑
j=0
µkλ
jXk,t−j + ut (1.7)
where λ, δ ∈ [0, 1] are one period discount factors, and k = 1, 2, 3...K.
The prospective voting model can be derived by assuming µk = 0, in
Equation (1.7) as:
Vt = a+ Et
(
K∑
k=1
T∑
j=1
φkδ
jXk,t+j
)
+ ut (1.8)
Empirical analysis of forward voting requires specification of how ex-
pectations are formed. There are two ways: univariate time series model
(Random walk with drift; ARMA and ARIMA models) and the uncon-
strained multivariate auto-regression models (VAR). Either way, using the
pre-election histories to forecast post-election realization of relevant macroe-
conomic variables yields prospective voting equations that are observation-
ally equivalent to retrospective equations. This theoretical deficiency was
overcome by so-called “rational retrospective” models [Hibbs (2006), p.574].
Rational retrospective voting set-ups originate with “signaling”models de-
vised by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990). They motivate the
1The lag-lead sequences in Equation (1.6) are based on the timing conven-
tion that elections yielding Vt, Vt+1, . . . Vt+T , occur after the realization of outcomes
Xk,t, Xk,t+1, . . . Xk,t+T
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fiscally driven political business cycles when incumbents face a forward-
looking electorate endowed with rational expectations, as opposed to the
backward-looking “myopic” electorate relying upon adaptive expectations
that was assumed in Nordhaus (1975). The central idea is that economic
voting is driven by the competence of the incumbent in producing favor-
able macroeconomic performance beyond what would be anticipated from
the economy’s development in a policy-neutral environment. The compe-
tence of elected authorities in managing the economy is persistent, and
consequently voters are able to infer useful information about unobserved
post-election macroeconomics performance by observed pre-election perfor-
mance. The mechanics of the rational decision-making process depends
upon assumptions about the electorate’s information set and the persis-
tence of competence of the incumbents.
Rational retrospective, persistent competency models are quite inge-
nious but such models have received no support from the data. Alesina,
Londregan and Rosenthal (1993) and Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) test
empirically the rational retrospective approach on US data and found that
US voting outcomes responded to observed output growth rates, rather
than growth rate innovations owing to persistent competence carrying over
to the future. In view of these findings, the rational retrospective model was
rejected empirically in favor of conventional retrospective voting models.
Assuming φk = 0, and k = 1, 2, ...K in Equation (1.7) gives a constrained
model of pure retrospective voting suited to empirical testing such [Hibbs
(2006), p.575]:
Vt = a+
K∑
k=1
T−1∑
j=0
µkλ
jXk,t−j + ut (1.9)
The basic functional form of Equation (1.9) first proposed by Stigler
(1973) in his prescient critique of Kramer (1971). Stigler worked mainly
with a single macroeconomic variable–changes in per capita income and
was the first who suggested changes in permanent income calibrated over a
substantial retrospective horizon and would logically have effects on voting.
Moreover, Stigler yet again was the first to connect instability of economic
voting regression results to variation in the “powers and responsibilities”
of the incumbent party. Following Kramer, Stigler focused primarily on
aggregate congressional vote shares going to party holding the White House
and his results did not yield much evidence of stable macroeconomic voting
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from the turn of the twentieth century up to the mid-1960s.
However, about a decade afterwards Hibbs (1982) showed that the basic
retrospective set-up of Equation (1.9), specified with growth rates of per
capita real disposable personal incomes over the fifteen post-inauguration
quarters of a presidential term as the only regressors, explained postwar
aggregates presidential voting outcomes remarkably well. The biggest de-
viations from fitted vote shares were recorded at the war election of 1952
(Korea) and 1968 (Vietnam). A subsequent version of the basic set-up Hi-
bbs (2000) “Bread and Peace Model”, took direct account of the electoral
consequences of US involvement in undeclared wars by proposing the fol-
lowing simple retrospective equation, which was fit to data on aggregate
presidential voting over 1952–96.
Vt = α + β1
14∑
j=0
λj1∆lnRt−j + β2
14∑
j=0
λj2KIAt−jNQt + ut (1.10)
• Where V is the incumbent party’s percentage share of the two-party
presidential vote,
• R is quarterly per capita disposable personal income deflated by the
Consumer Price Index, ∆lnRt denotes log(Rt/Rt−1).400, i.e. the an-
nualized quarter-on-quarter percentage rate of growth of R,
• KIA denotes the number of Americans killed in action per quarter in
the Korean and Vietnamese civil wars, andNQ is a binary nullification
term equal to “0.0” for Q quarters following the election of a new
president, and “1.0” otherwise. NQ defines the “grace period” for new
presidents “inheriting” US interventions in Korea and Vietnam, that
is, the number of quarters into each president’s administration over
which KIA exerted no effect at the subsequent presidential election.
Hibbs (2000) found out that real income growth accounted for around
90 percent of the variance of presidential voting outcomes was the result of
“non-war” elections, while incumbents vote share was reduced by around
11 percentage points due to war in Korea and Vietnam in 1952 and 1968.
This was almost certainly the reason for the Democratic Party to loose the
elections. No Postwar event–economic or political–affected US presidential
voting by anything close to this magnitude (Weingast and Wittman, 2008).
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1.1.4 German Elections, Voting Behavior and Eco-
nomic Outcomes
In chapter two, we have studied the German economy and its experience
in terms of economic voting and elections outcomes during the post war
period. In the voting behavior models, we have selected the Hibbs “Bread
and Peace Model” and analyzed the German economy during the postwar
period 1953-2005. Our research has focused on finding the answers to these
questions:
1. Are voters backward-or forward-looking?
2. If voters are backward-looking, how far do they look back and how
much do they discount past events?
3. Do voters vote according to their pocketbooks or according to the
national economic situation?
4. How does the political system (accountability) affect the importance
of economic variables?
We find support for the hypothesis that voters are backward-looking and
they consider the whole legislative term with only small discounting of past
events. They vote according to the national economic situation i.e. per
capita real disposable income growth of the economy. As in Hibbs (2008)
for the United States we find that the aggregate votes for incumbent parties
in post-war Germany were determined by the weighted-average growth of
real per capita disposable income of the economy. Each percentage point of
per capita real disposable income growth sustained over the legislative term
yielded approximately two percentage points of votes in Germany. Even
though, the United States and Germany have different political systems.
The only difference we can identify is that the growth effect on vote shares
in Germany is only half the effect in United States. No other economic
variables add value or significantly perturb the coefficients of our model.
However, attrition of power is turned out to be an additional variable ex-
plaining German election results that has reduced the vote share in election
years 1961, 1994 and 1998, when the chancellor sought re-election for the
third or more times.
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1.2 Economic Voting and Political Economic
Cycles
The second part of my dissertation deals with the extension of economic
voting to political economic cycles. When economic policy-makers are di-
rectly elected (or directly appointed by the elected officials), how do electoral
incentives structure economic policy-making? Suppose voters prefer candi-
dates expected to deliver greater economic well-being. Voters may evaluate
candidates on recent experience, perhaps on aggregate experience. As a
result, incumbents seeking re-election have powerful incentives to improve
voter’s economic fortunes, or to signal or feign such ability. If voters weigh
recent pasts more heavily than distant periods, the incentives to manipulate
economic policy to improve the likelihood of re-election sharpen as election
approach. Such electioneering may result in cycles of economic expansion
and contraction that follow electoral cycles.
The literature on political and economic cycles developed in two clearly
distinct phases. The first phase flourished in the mid 1970s, uses the tradi-
tional macroeconomic models, in which taking advantage of an exploitable
Phillips curve, governments can systematically and predictably influence
macroeconomic outcomes. The first strand of this literature emphasizes pol-
icymakers’ “opportunistic” motivation [Nordhaus (1975); Lindbeck (1976)].
Politicians have no policy preferences of their own, so they choose the poli-
cies that maximize their chances of electoral victory. The second strand of
the literature emphasizes, instead, policy makers partisan motivation [Hibbs
(1977)]. Specifically according to this view, left-wing parties are relatively
more concerned with unemployment than with inflation, and right-wing
parties have opposite concerns. Moreover, parties stick to their electoral
platform when in office.
The second phase of the literature evolved in the mid 1980s as a branch
of the game-theoretic approach to macroeconomic policy, an approach pi-
oneered by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983).
These models of political cycles incorporate rational expectations and em-
phasize how a rational public limits the extent to which policymakers can
influence the economic cycle. Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Rogoff and
Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990) and Persson and Tabellini (1990) developed
opportunistic models with rational expectations. Alesina (1987) suggests a
partisan model with rational expectations. These two models differ on two
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critical dimensions. First, they may be either “partisan” or “opportunistic”.
Partisan models focus on differences in policies and outcomes as a result of
different government’s ideological orientations. On the other hand, oppor-
tunistic models claim that every government behaves in the same way i.e.
opportunistically to win re-election. Second, they may be “traditional”or
“rational”. Traditional models theorize that governments exploit their abil-
ities to predict and influence macroeconomic outcomes. On the other hand,
rational expectations models emphasize the limits on the policymakers’s
ability to influence, permanently and predictably, the state of the economy.
This rationality constraint affects both, the policy (via voting behavior) and
the economy (via the expectations-augmented Phillips curve).
In chapter three we have focused on the identification and existence
of the political business cycles in macroeconomic indicators, as well as in
monetary and fiscal instruments in the case of Pakistan. Pakistan is a devel-
oping country in terms of economic growth as well as in terms of democracy,
having more than 180 million population and low literacy rate. These con-
ditions put the politicians at great advantage that they have the chance to
use the economic policies in the direction of maximizing their chance of re-
election [ (Brender and Drazen,2005b)]. The present study investigates the
existence of political business cycles in case of Pakistan during the period
1973–2009 and covers seven parliamentarian election terms. Single-country
studies of the political business cycle often suffer from a small number of
elections. However, the political business cycle is a phenomenon that may or
may not occur in a country and a multi country study is not able to answer
the question if there have been political business cycles in a special country
or not. To proof the existence of a political business cycle in Pakistan, a
single- country study is inevitable.
A number of studies have analyzed politically motivated business cycles
for both developed and developing countries. Generally, the empirical po-
litical business cycle literature can be divided into three main categories.
The first category attempts to locate the political business cycles in macroe-
conomic outcomes. These models have been focused almost exclusively on
four macroeconomic indicators: growth, inflation, unemployment and in-
come. In the short run policy results on growth and unemployment may
not be obvious enough to voters, therefore governments may try to stimulate
those policy variables that have direct monetary benefits to voters like gov-
ernment transfers, tax cuts, subsidies and special employment schemes etc.
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The second major category of political business cycle research concentrates
on these policy instruments instead of macroeconomic outcomes. The third
major category of research focuses on a unique policy instrument: mone-
tary policy (also known as the political monetary cycle). To cover all three
categories, this study focuses on economic growth, unemployment, inflation
and some fiscal and monetary policy indicators. Despite plenty of empiri-
cal evidences found on political business cycles (PBC) for both developed
and developing countries, this area of research remains untouched in case
of Pakistan. The present study is a valuable addition to fill this gap.
The main objectives of this work are to study the dynamic behavior
of the unemployment, inflation, real GDP growth and some monetary and
fiscal indicators affected by the timing of elections. Simple time series in-
tervention analysis has been utilized to test the PBC’s hypothesis.
Results are summarized as follows:
1. Unemployment tends to be lower in pre-election periods and tends to
increase immediately after elections, perhaps as a result of politically
motivated employment schemes.
2. Inflation tends to be lower in pre-election periods, perhaps as a result
of pre-electoral price regulation.
3. We find an increase in the governmental budget deficit, financed by
heavy government borrowings from the central bank and banking sec-
tor in the election year.
4. Real GDP growth and real governmental investment growth declines
during pre and post-election years.
Thus, empirical evidence supports the presence of opportunistic politi-
cal behavior in unemployment and inflation and other economic variables
during pre-and post-election periods in Pakistan.
1.3 Central Bank Independence and Elec-
toral Politics
The third part of this dissertation concentrates on the sub-field of the po-
litical economy that is concerned specifically with the monetary policy and
monetary institutions in opportunistic political setup. The central bank
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controls the monetary policy. However, there are a number of channels
identified through which governments and legislatures have an indirect in-
fluence on the monetary policy [Alesina et al. (1997), p.212]. These are as
follows:
1. Central bank’s institutional structure.
2. Presence of government representatives on central bank’s boards.
3. Explicit or implicit obligations of the central bank to accommodate
fiscal policy.
4. Informal contacts between treasury and the central bank.
5. The executive power to appoint the central bank’s board and governor.
6. The desire of central banks of not displeasing the politicians too much
for fear of losing their prerogatives and autonomy.
In recent decades, economists and political scientists have theoretically
mapped out a range of issues such as the political vulnerability of mone-
tary policy and proposed institutional solutions. They also have demon-
strated empirically that monetary institutions make a difference over time
and across countries for monetary policy and economic performance2.
The idea is that insulating monetary policy from the politicians’ di-
rect control and by appointing a conservative (i.e. inflation-averse) central
banker, one can reduce inflation from a level that is too high because of
the policy makers (opportunistic or partisan) fruitless attempt to reduce
average unemployment. In other words, independent central banks are a
mean of achieving credibility in policy making and insulating the monetary
policy from the political pressures, thus reducing the average and variability
of inflation. In response to these findings, countries all over the world have
adopted independent central banks, or granted their pre-existing central
banks a higher degree of independence.
Central bank independence can be classified into two categories: po-
litical independence and economic independence. Political independence is
defined in terms of three institutional factors: (1) the procedure for appoint-
ing members of the central banks governing body; (2) the legal relationship
of the central bank with the government and (3) the formal legal responsi-
bilities of the central bank. While economic independence is measured by
2For details see the survey article by (Lohmann,2008).
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the autonomy of the central bank in controlling the monetary instruments,
banking supervision and central bank obligation in terms of monetizing the
fiscal deficit [Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991)]. Chapter four de-
scribes that the Pakistan central bank is not among the list of independent
central banks. There are a number of facts: (1) the State Bank formulates
its monetary policy on pre-announced growth and inflation objectives by
the government; (2) the president’s sole authority on appointment and re-
moval of governing bodies; (3) mandatory involvement of the government in
the board; (4) and ever growing deficit financing pressure; speaks a volume
about its political and economic independence. In view of Pakistan central
bank’s political and economic independence, one may suspect the presence
of electoral politics and its implication on monetary policy. Therefore, in
this work an attempt has been made to investigate the existence of politi-
cal monetary cycles. The underlying hypothesis is that if monetary policy
is used as an attempt to create political cycles, then monetary policy in-
struments must have an election-related cycle or political monetary cycle
(PMC).
Following Abrams and Iossifov (2006), we have estimated a Taylor type
interest rate reaction function for the period 1985Q1–2010Q4. The period
consists of six parliamentarian election terms. Estimated results shows that
whenever there is an increase in the real output gap/real GDP growth and
inflationary pressures in the economy, the central bank tightens its mone-
tary policy by raising the discount rate. To test the existence of political
monetary cycles, we have introduced some political dummies in the esti-
mated baseline models. The electoral political dummies are found to be
negative and significant accepting the PMC hypothesis. Our results are in
line with the Alpenda and Honig (2009) and Batool and Sieg (2009b) find-
ings, that assigns central bank independence ranking based on the existence
of electoral monetary cycles. We found that the Pakistan central bank is
not free from the political pressures as its monetary policy is facilitating the
incumbents in the run-up to elections.
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Bread and the Attrition of
Power: Economic Events and
German Election Results
All political history shows that the standing of a Government
and its ability to hold the confidence of the electorate at General
Elections depend on the success of its economic policy (Prime
Minster Wilson, in David Watt, Financial Times, March 8, 1968).
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Bread and the Attrition of Power:
Economic Events and German Election Results
2.1 Introduction
There may be many reasons for supporting or opposing a government. How-
ever, German elections should be viewed as a sequence of referenda on the
government’s economic record. Growth of real per capita disposable income
explains the variations in aggregate voting outcomes except 1961, 1994 and
1998. In the 1961, 1994 and 1998 elections the German chancellor sought
re-election more than twice and received significantly fewer votes.
Although it is obvious that economic conditions affect voting behavior,
there is a large body of literature examining the economic variables that
are most important for voter decisions3. The main questions are:
1. Are voters backward-looking [Key (1968)] or forward-looking [Downs
(1957)]?
2. If voters are backward-looking, how far back do they look and how
much do they discount past events?
3. Do voters vote according to their pocketbooks or according to the
national economic situation [Lewis-Beck (1988)]?
4. How does the political system (accountability) affect the importance
of economic variables?
We find support for the hypothesis that voters are backward-looking and
that they consider the whole legislative term with only small discounting
of past events. They vote according to the national economic situation,
i.e., the per capita disposable income growth of the economy. As in Hibbs
(2008) for the United States we find that weighted-average per capita real
growth in disposable income is the only economic variable that explains
vote shares in Germany. Even though the United States and Germany
have different political systems the only difference between Germany and
the United States we can identify is that the growth effect on vote shares
in Germany is only half the effect in the United States. These results
raise questions about some of the stylized facts summarized by Lewis-Beck
and Paldam (2000). Furthermore, in our estimation, inflation is irrelevant,
contrary to the stylized fact that inflation and unemployment/growth are
relevant for vote functions.
3See Drazen (2000), Hibbs (2006), Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2007), Nannestad and
Paldam (1994), and Mu¨eller (2003) for surveys of the literature.
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Bread and the Attrition of Power:
Economic Events and German Election Results
Our approach follows the literature explaining aggregate votes in terms
of economic fundamentals. Fair (1978) identifies the change in real eco-
nomic activity in the year of the election and a high discount rate on past
economic performance. Lewis-Beck (1988) argues that voters do not vote on
the basis of their own personal economic situation, but rather on the basis of
national economic performance. Hibbs (1982, 2000) identifies the weighted-
average growth of real disposable personal income over the complete term
of office as the only important economic variable that explains voting in
United States presidential elections. Whereas authors such as Frey and
Garbers (1972), Kirchgaessner (1974, 1985) and Frey and Schneider (1979)
were pioneers in the field of popularity and policy reaction functions and
thoroughly examined Germany, they used popularity rather than election
results as the explanatory variable4. Obviously, for earlier analysis of the
1970s, there had not been enough data from post-war elections in Germany.
However, we explain election results instead of polling results and there-
fore avoid the problems with polls: they cover fewer persons, do not have
real effects and target subjects without advance notice and only before an
election campaign.
Whereas the duties of the German federal president are largely represen-
tative and ceremonial, power is exercised by the Federal Chancellor (“Bun-
deskanzler”) who heads the Federal Government and thus the executive
branch of the political system. He or she is elected by and is responsible to
the “Bundestag”, Germany’s main chamber of parliament, to which mem-
bers are elected for four-year terms. In the election voters cast two votes,
the first called “Erststimme” and the second “Zweitstimme”. The first vote
is to elect members of parliament in single-seat constituencies using a first-
past-the-post voting system. Aggregated second votes determine the seats
a party receives in the Bundestag, although the precise number of seats won
depends on some special rules5. Therefore, the main vote is the second vote
because it determines the weight for a party and, indirectly, the chancellor.
With just one exception in post-World War II Germany, no single party has
ever achieved an absolute majority of seats in the parliament. Therefore,
parties join a coalition that elects a member of the largest coalition party
4Cusack (1999), Feld and Kirchgaessner (2000) and Geys and Vermeir (2008) use
popularity ratings as well.
51. A party has to get 5 percent or three seats in single-seat constituencies to get the
proportional share. 2. A seat won in a single-seat constituency is guaranteed. 3. The
proportional share is calculated with reference to single states.
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as chancellor. These coalitions of parties usually hold for a full legislative
term of four years.
This chapter tests and extends the Bread and Peace model of Hibbs
(2000) for Germany. To simplify matters, the chapter broadly follows Hi-
bbs (2000). We use, if possible, the same test variables with identical text
headings as Hibbs (2000). Section 2 presents results for the model as ap-
plied to Germany. In Section 3 we examine the stochastic properties of our
explanatory variables. Section 4 shows that other variables that might be
useful in explaining election results can be omitted. Section 5 summarizes
the results.
2.2 The Model
The Bread and Peace model assumes that growth in real disposable personal
income per capita is the best single-variable election predictor because real
disposable personal income includes income from all market sources and is
adjusted for inflation, taxes, government transfer payments, and population
growth. It also includes the income effects of unemployment.
To determine the election result we define as vote share the share of
votes6 for parties that were members of the ruling coalition in the legislative
period prior to the election. Hibbs (2000) and Fair (1978) use the two-
party vote share in their estimations to incorporate the effect of elections
in which there are only two presidential candidates, but sometimes there
is a third. They implicitly accumulate votes for the third candidate in
proportion to the votes for candidates of the Republican and Democrat
parties. This is appropriate for the United States , but is not necessary for
the proportional system used in Germany, whereby a voter who wants to
support the government may vote for a small coalition party.
We exclude the 1969 and 1983 election cycles. From 1966 to 1969 there
was a grand coalition of both large parties and therefore even those voters
who were disappointed with economic growth probably voted for one of
these parties. In 1983 the government coalition was in office only for six
months because one party switched coalition during the term, and therefore
a vote for the current government could have been a vote against the poor
economic performance of its predecessor.
6We use the share of valid “Zweitstimmen”.
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The equation used to generate the data depicted in Figure 2.1 is:
Vt = β0 + β1
(
ft∆ lnRt +
∑lt
j=1 λ
j∆ lnRt−j
ft +
∑lt
j=1 λ
j
)
+ β2DUR, (2.1)
where
• V is the sum of vote shares of the parties making up the governing
coalition at the time of the election.
• R is the per capita growth in disposable personal income deflated
by the consumer price index, and ∆ lnRt is the annualized quarter-
on-quarter percentage rate of growth, ∆ lnRt = ln(Rt/Rt−1) ∗ 400
expressed in annualized percentage points (multiplication by 400).
• lt is the number of quarters from the last election to the current elec-
tion t, excluding the quarter of and the quarter after the previous
election.
• ft is a variable that captures the weight of the election quarter and
equals the fraction of elapsed days on the election day in that quarter
to the number of all days in the quarter.
• λ = 0.98 measures the discounting of past events by voters.
• ft+
∑lt
j=1 λ
j is a normalizing constant, so that β1 registers the response
of votes to movements in the weighted average of real income growth
rates.
• DUR is a dummy variable as defined in Fair (1996) that equals 1 only
if the chancellor is seeking re-election for the third time and 1.25 if
the chancellor is seeking re-election for the fourth time. Before 1990,
East German citizens were not allowed to cast votes for the Bundestag
because the former GDR (East Germany) was an independent state.
Therefore, in 1994 chancellor Kohl sought re-election for the third time
in the former West Germany (approximately 83 percent of all voters)
but for the first time in East Germany (approximately 17 percent of
all voters). To capture reunification, the DUR variable is 0.83 for 1994
and 1.0375 for 1998, i.e., Fair’s value multiplied by 0.83.
The parameters used to draw the trend line in Figure 2.1 are β0 = 44.99,
β1 = 1.98 (as estimated in Table 2.1) and β2 = 0 because DUR=0 for
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most elections. To demonstrate the attrition-of-power effect in 1994 and
1998, the predicted vote shares for these years (using the estimated DUR
variable) are indicated by triangles. Furthermore, results without the DUR
variable are presented in Table 2.7. Considering the time period from 1972
to 2005, a coalition of parties that offers average growth during the term
earns a vote share of 47.96 percent and each additional percentage point of
growth adds 1.98 percentage points in votes.
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Figure 2.1: Weighted-average Real Per Capita Growth in Disposable Income
and Vote Share of the Incumbent Party during 1972–2005 (Quarterly Data).
Incumbent vote share V 1972–2005 N = 9 elections
R2=0.79 Adj. R2=0.72 Root MSE=2.17
Coef. estimate Std. error p-value
Constant β0 44.99 1.87 0.0000
Weighted-average 01.98 0.53 0.0094
per capita real disposable
personal income growth
rate, % (β1)
Chancellor for re-election −5.21 2.31 0.0660
more than twice
DUR (β2)
Table 2.1: Model Equation Estimates for Quarterly Data.
Because quarterly data for per capita disposable personal income are
not available prior to 1970, we used yearly data to produce Figure 2.2. The
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equation used to generate the data depicted in Figure 2.2 is:
Vt = β0 + β1
(
ft∆ lnRt +
∑lt
j=1 λ
j∆ lnRt−j
ft +
∑lt
j=1 λ
j
)
+ β2DUR, (2.2)
where definitions of parameters are as for Equation (2.1) with the ex-
ception of:
• R is the per capita growth in disposable personal income deflated by
the consumer price index, and ∆ lnRt is the percentage rate of growth,
∆ lnRt = ln(Rt/Rt−1) ∗ 100.
• lt is the number of years from the last election to the current election
t.
• ft is a variable that captures the weight of the election year and equals
the fraction of elapsed days on the election day in that year to the
number of all days in the year.
• λ = 0.65 measures the discounting of past events by voters.
• ft+
∑lt
j=1 λ
j is a normalizing constant, so that β1 registers the response
of the vote share to movements in the weighted average of real income
growth rates.
• DUR is defined as for Equation (2.1) and therefore equals 1 in 1961 be-
cause the German chancellor Konrad Adenauer was seeking re-election
for the third time.
The parameters used to draw the trend line in Figure 2.2 are β0 = 47.77,
β1 = 1.62 (as estimated in Table 2.2) and β2 = 0 because DUR=0 for most
elections. To demonstrate the attrition-of-power effect in 1961, 1994 and
1998, the predicted vote shares for these years (using the estimated DUR
variable) are indicated by triangles. The results are shown in Table 2.2.
Furthermore, results without the DUR variable are presented in Table 2.8.
The estimates without the DUR variable for the time periods 1972–2005
(Table 2.7) and 1953–2005 (Table 2.8) show that the coefficient estimates
for the constant and the personal income growth rate are in the range of
one standard error of each other. This result does not hold if we include the
DUR variable. The attrition-of-power effect for the 1961 election seems to be
different from the effect in 1994 and 1998. Chancellor Adenauer’s attrition-
of-power effect in 1961 is greater than that for Chancellor Kohl in the 1994
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Figure 2.2: Weighted-average Real Per Capita Growth in Disposable Income
and Vote Share of the Incumbent Party during 1953–2005 (Yearly Data).
and 1998 elections (even if adjusted for reunification). Therefore, when
we measure the attrition-of-power effect using only one dummy variable,
we estimate the average effect, i.e., some values are above and some are
below the average. For the 1998 election the estimated DUR effect is less
than the actual value for quarterly data and higher in the case of annual
data (Figures 2.1 and 2.2). In the case of quarterly data, the DUR dummy
captures the average effect of 1994 and 1998, so the triangle point is lower
than the actual 1994 value and higher than the actual 1998 value. For
yearly data the DUR variable captures the average attrition-of-power effect
Incumbent vote share 1953–2005 N = 13 elections
(V )% R2=0.78 Adj. R2=0.73 Root MSE=3.36
Coef. estimate Std. error p-value
Constant β0 47.77 1.86 0.0000
Weighted-average 01.62 0.35 0.0010
per capita real disposable
personal income growth
rate, % (β1)
Chancellor for re-election −8.33 2.65 0.0104
more than twice
DUR (β2)
Table 2.2: Model Equation Estimates for Yearly Data.
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for 1961, 1994 and 1998. Since the attrition-of-power effect seems to be
greater in 1961 than in 1994 and 1998, the average value for quarterly data
is greater (larger negative term). As a result, we obtain a lower estimate
for 1998, as shown in Figure 2.2. Therefore, we are reluctant to specify
precisely the attrition-of-power effect for Germany.
Even though the political systems of the United States and Germany
are quite different, our parameter estimates are quite similar to the results
of Hibbs (2000, 2008). Comparing our results to those of Hibbs (2008)
for 1972–2005 reveals that the constant for Germany is approximately one
standard error smaller than the constant for the United States. The reason
could be that Hibbs uses the two-party vote share and Germany has a
multi-party system. There is a difference in the parameter for the weighted-
average growth rate of per capita real disposable personal income, which is
approximately two-fold greater for the United States than for Germany.
To estimate the weighting parameter λ we used a non-linear estimation
approach. In the United States the election term is always 15 quarters (16
quarters for the presidential term minus the inauguration quarter) whereas
in Germany it varies from term to term. For instance, the 2005 election
term consisted of 11 quarters, the 2002 election term consisted of 15 quarters
and the 1998 election term consisted of 14 quarters. Therefore, we modified
the Hibbs (2000, 2008) method for estimating λ and found that λ=0.98
minimizes the sum of squares of residuals for quarterly data and λ=0.65
(which corresponds to a quarterly value of at least 0.90) for annual data.
The Hibbs (2000) value is 0.909 and he cannot reject the hypothesis that
λ = 1.
Table 2.6 shows that the largest prediction errors occur for 1957, 1961,
and 2005. In 1957 the government profited from the launch of a generous
pay-as-you-go pension system. In the 1961 election one of the opposition
parties (FDP) campaigned to enter a coalition with the incumbent party
to get rid of the incumbent chancellor, and obtained a vote share approxi-
mately corresponding to the sum of the prediction error and the attrition-
of-power effect. The election in 2005 was early because the chancellor had
lost a vote of confidence.
The Bread and Peace model is of significance not only because it iden-
tifies fundamentals that are important for election results, but also because
it makes it clear that no economic variable other than real disposable per
capita income growth adds value or significantly perturbs its coefficients.
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Furthermore, Hibbs (2008) explains election outcomes in terms of objec-
tively measured political-economic fundamentals and does not use dummy
variables that are coded arbitrarily. However, the argument that voters
eventually tire of a politician or a party cannot be rejected, especially for
the German elections of 1961 and 1998 [Abramowitz (1988); Campbell and
Wink (1990); Haynes and Stone (1994)]. Therefore it is not surprising that
attrition of power is an additional variable explaining German election re-
sults. [Fair (1996), p. 95] uses a duration variable DUR that increases by
k = 0.25 for each additional consecutive term of office for a party, starting
with a value of 1 if the party has been in power for three consecutive terms.
However, we define DUR in terms of the chancellor rather than the party
or coalition in office. The United States president is not prone to the same
attrition of power as a German chancellor because the United States pres-
ident can be re-elected just once, whereas a German chancellor can hold
office as long as his or her coalition wins majorities.
On the other hand it is impossible to identify statistically a peace effect
in Germany. The number of German military fatalities due to unprovoked,
hostile deployment of German armed forces in foreign conflicts not sanc-
tioned by a formal parliamentary declaration of war, which is the Hibbs
(2008) definition of the peace variable, is zero for the whole period. Fair
(1996) also corrects for war years, but defines war elections as dominated
by World War I or II. The period in the present study does not cover either
global conflict. To summarize, it is impossible to confirm the peace part of
the Bread and Peace model for Germany.
2.3 Stochastic Properties of Real Per-capita
Personal Disposable Income
In this study, as usual when testing vote share functions, the number of
observations is rather small. Therefore, it is of particular importance to
take into account the stochastic properties of the dependent variable. We
have estimated the equation:
∆ lnRt = α + δt+ γ lnRt−1 +
p∑
i=2
βi∆ lnRt−i+1 + rt (2.3)
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to test for unit roots using the Augmented Dickey and Fuller (1979) method.
The estimated values for α, δ, and γ are shown in Table 2.3, with lag lengths
reported in column p of the Table 2.3. First we check for a deterministic
trend in the estimated model. Regression 1 shows that the δ term is in-
significant, i.e., there is no deterministic trend in the real disposable income
per capita growth. Therefore, we omit the trend term in regressions 2 and
3 in Table 2.3. In regressions 2 and 3 (Table 2.3), if γ = 0, the series has a
unit root, which means that it is non-stationary. The results for regression
2 show that the t-value of γ is less than the ADF critical value. Therefore,
we accept the null hypothesis that the series has a unit root. To make the
series stationary, we take the first-difference of log per capita disposable
income, i.e., the growth in real per capita disposable income. The test re-
sult for regression 3 (Table 2.3) shows that the t-value of γ is greater than
the ADF critical value. This implies that growth in real per capita dispos-
able income is stationary. It follows that quarter-to-quarter changes in log
real disposable income per capita growth ∆ lnRt are unforecastable, apart
from an annualized drift rate α of approximately 0.23 percent per quarter.
Therefore, rt can be interpreted as “news” in real disposable income per
capita growth rates that are permanently embodied in future real income
stocks lnRt. Voters reward or punish the incumbent party at election time
by evaluating the good or bad news that represents changes in the time
path of mean real disposable personal income.
Model: ∆ lnRt = α+ δt+ γ lnRt−1 +
∑p
i=2 βi∆ lnRt−i+1 + rt
α δ γ p AdjR2 LMχ2sig.level ADF test value
1. 0.47 0.00009 -0.055 4 0.87 0.28 -3.43
(1.58/0.12) (0.86/0.39) (-1.54/0.12)
2. 0.23 -0.03 4 0.86 0.36 -2.88
(1.92/0.05) (-1.89/0.06)
3. 0.003 -1.39 3 0.95 0.12 -2.88
(1.73/0.08) (-5.38/0.0000)
Notes: Values in parentheses are (t-ratio/significance level).
1991:4, the first period of the revised disposable income, is omitted.
Table 2.3: Stochastic Properties of the Log Real Per Capita Disposable
Personal Income Growth (1970:01–2005:04).
Table 2.4 supplies additional evidence that log real disposable income
per capita growth rates are unforecastable. Regressions 1, 2 and 3 (Table
2.4) show that runs of good and bad news have no systematic relationship
to the party of the chancellor. If this were not the case, a voter motivated
by real income performance would be endowed ex-ante with valuable in-
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∆ lnRt − α− γ lnRt−1 −
∑p
i=2 βi∆ lnRt−i+1 = rt
rt = C + PoliticalPeriodst−1
C CDU term SPD term Terms following party re-election
1. -0.001 0.003
(-0.56/0.57) (0.80/0.42)
2. 0.002 -0.002
(0.56/0.57) (-.79/0.42)
3. 0.002 -0.002
(0.81/0.42) (-0.75/0.45)
4. 0.003 -0.004
(0.99/0.32) (-1.14/0.25)
Notes: Values in parentheses are (t-ratio/significance level).
1991:4, the first period of the revised disposable income, is omitted.
Table 2.4: Election terms and Per Capita Real Disposable Personal Income
Growth Rate “News” 1970:1–2005:4.
formation about the economic competence of candidates. The results for
regression 4 (Table 2.4) indicate that the performance of incumbent parties
also yields no useful information about likely growth rate deviations from
drift immediately following their re-election.
2.4 Omitted Variables
To test the robustness of the estimated model, we investigated a number
of variables other than disposable income growth and duration that are
highlighted in the literature on vote shares. The results of these regression
experiments are shown in Table 2.5. The second column of each row reports
parameter estimates, t-ratios and significance levels (p-values) for the ad-
ditional test variable. The third column gives the significance level for the
null hypothesis of parameter equivalence between the bread and attrition of
power model coefficients obtained for each test regression equation and the
corresponding basic bread estimates in Table 2.17. All baseline variables
remain significant upon introduction of the following variables.
Old news: In our model we assume that backward-looking voters review
the whole election period but ignore economic growth that occurred
earlier. Therefore, we have to test whether economic performance
prior to the last election influences voting decisions in the current
election. As in Hibbs (2000), we use the lagged incumbent parties
7Quarterly data are not available prior to 1970, and therefore robustness tests are
based on the data set for 1972–2005.
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Model: Vt = β0 + β1
(
ft∆ lnRt+
∑lt
j=1 λ
j∆ lnRt−j
ft+
∑lt
j=1 λ
j
)
+ β2DUR + β3test variables
Signif. level for
Test variable(s) Test variable equivalence of
parameter βˆ0, βˆ1, to
estimates benchmark
(t-ratio/ estimates in
signif. level) Table 2.1
1. Old news 0.30 0.60
(Incumbent coalition’s vote share (1.06/0.33)
at last election)
2. Inflation 0.25 0.94
(0.42/0.69)
3. Unemployment rate −0.10 0.95
(−0.29/0.77)
4. Change in unemployment −0.21 0.97
(−0.41/0.69)
5. Election year output growth 0.25 0.96
(0.40/0.70)
6. Inflation over the term 0.11 0.83
(0.76/0.47)
7. Number of high-growth 0.08 0.97
quarters, good news (0.21/0.83)
8. Volatility (standard deviation) 0.28 0.89
of ∆ lnR over the term (0.50/0.63)
9. Per capita real govt. 0.03 0.94
expenditure over the term (0.66/0.53)
10. Govt. expenditure in -0.07 0.99
proportion to GDP over the term (-0.16/0.87)
11. Stock prices: percent change -0.03 0.95
in DAX30 for 10 months prior (−0.57/0.59)
to the election month
12. Average yield spread (10-year bonds −0.49 0.95
rate minus 1-year bond rate) (−0.39/0.71)
during the 3 months
following the election
Table 2.5: Robustness of the Model to Additional Variables.
vote share, which summarize the economic performance of the pre-
election period, termed “old news”, as the test variable. The coef-
ficient estimate of old news reveals that there is no spillover effect
associated with the past performances of incumbent parties on cur-
rent vote shares. The coefficient estimate for the vote share of the
incumbent party in the previous election is essentially zero and the
p-value for the hypothesis of joint parameter equivalence is 0.60.
Inflation and unemployment: From the beginning of voting economics,
inflation and unemployment have been the most popular measures of
performances of incumbent parties and of voters responses in terms of
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rewarding or punishing governments. Here we included the weighted
average inflation and weighted average unemployment over the term as
additional explanatory variables. Both variables were not significant
and did not improve the fits of the models estimated in Table 2.1.
Similarly, a change in unemployment is redundant, with a insignificant
t-value, and a p-value of 0.97 shows the parameter equivalence to the
estimates in Table 2.1.
Fair’s economy: Test variables 5, 6 and 7 (Table 2.5) are Fair’s three well-
known variables: g3, the average growth rate of real per capita GDP
in the first three quarters of the election year; p, the absolute value
of inflation over the election term; and n-good, the number of “good
news” quarters during the term in which annual GDP growth exceeds
potential GDP growth, which we calculate using a Rodrick-Prescott
100 filter8. The results demonstrate that these three variable adds no
explanatory power to the estimated regression. However, the “good
news” variable is significant if we define a reference value to make it
significant or define it as the number of quarters in which GDP growth
is higher than average growth9. Test regressions 5, 6 and 7 in Table
2.5 demonstrate that the Fair variables do not add any value to the
Germany “Bread and the Attrition of Power model”.
Macroeconomic volatility: Cameron (1978) and Rodrik (1999) suggest
the macroeconomic stability of economic wellbeing is another im-
portant variable for democratic political outcomes. Following Hibbs
(2000) we tested volatility as the standard deviation of disposable in-
come growth over the term in test regression 8 (Table 2.5). Volatility
was also insignificant and the p-value demonstrates parameter equiva-
lence to the coefficient estimates in Table 2.1. We also tested volatility
based on inflation, but again obtained insignificant results.
Fiscal conservatism: Pelzman (1992) found that each percentage point
of growth in real federal spending per capita sustained for a year de-
creases the vote share of the incumbent party in presidential elections
8Since GDP growth patterns in Germany are dynamic over time in the sense that
average growth was approximately 3.35 before reunification in 1991 and approximately
1.18 thereafter, we have incorporated the concept of good-news quarters as quarters with
growth greater than potential output growth.
9Fair uses a reference value of 3.2 (and 2.9 in some cases) without relating them to
fundamentals, but only to obtain a better fit.
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by more than three percentage points. The reason is that voters re-
alize that additional fiscal expenditure will create excess tax burdens
on them. Test regressions 9 and 10 in Table 2.5 demonstrate that
cumulative changes in real per capita expenditure over the term and
cumulative changes in government spending in proportion to GDP had
no significant impact on the vote share of the incumbent coalition.
Changes in wealth (Stock prices): Fama (1990) and Schwert (1990) pro-
pose that stock price change is a valuable indicator of investor market
sentiment and forward macroeconomic expectations. Gleisner (1992)
and Haynes and Stone (1994) report that each percentage point in-
crease in the Dow Jones Industrial Average registered between Jan-
uary and October of the election year yields a vote share harvest of
between 0.4 and 0.7 percentage points for the incumbent party’s pres-
idential candidate. To test the sensitivity of vote share to market
sentiments and macroeconomic expectations, we used the DAX30 in-
dex. Conditioned on the estimated “Bread and the Attrition of Power
model” test regression 11 (Table 2.5), we find that stock price changes
have no significant impact on the vote share of the incumbent coali-
tion.
Interest rate spread: Forward-looking voters may use interest rate spreads
as a predictor of output changes in advance [Estrella and Hardouvelis
(1991), Estrella and Mishkin (1997)], i.e., they expect that the larger
the interest rate spread, the higher will be future output growth and
the lower will be the future probability of a recession. The argument
is endorsed by Berry et. al. (1996), who find evidence that the interest
rate spread affects employment, growth and inflation, which in turn di-
rectly or indirectly affects voter behavior. Combining forward-looking
voters and interest rate spreads as an indicator of future growth, it
follows that the higher the interest rate spread, the higher would be
the vote share of the incumbent’s party. In the present study, interest
rate spread is calculated as the difference between the long-term (10-
year) bond yield and the short-term bond yield (bonds with a 1-year
maturity period). The regression results in model 12 (Table 2.5) show
that interest rate spread has no significant impact on the estimated
vote share in Table 2.1.
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2.5 Conclusions
In Germany, the votes in general elections are determined by the weighted-
average growth of real per capita disposable income of the economy during
the election term. Considering the time period from 1972 to 2005, a coali-
tion of parties that offers average growth during the term earns a vote share
of 47.96 percent and each additional percentage point of growth adds 1.98
percentage points to votes. This result is in line with the Hibbs (2000, 2008)
Bread and Peace model for United States presidential elections. However,
the effect on the vote share is smaller in Germany than in the United States,
arguably because the political systems are very different or economic vari-
ables are not as important in Germany. Furthermore, in the 1961, 1994 and
1998 elections, the vote share was significantly lower because the chancellor
was seeking re-election after more than two terms in office and was a victim
of the attrition-of-power effect. This result coincides with the Fair (1996)
“duration” effect and the time-for-change effect of Abramowitz (1988, 2001).
It is impossible to identify statistically a peace effect in Germany because
the number of German military fatalities due to unprovoked, hostile deploy-
ment of German armed forces in foreign conflicts not sanctioned by a formal
parliamentary declaration of war is zero for the time period considered in
this paper, i.e., after World War II. As in Hibbs (2000), no other economic
variables add value or significantly perturb the equation’s coefficients10.
10Acknowledgments: The authors thank two anonymous referees and the editor for
very helpful comments. The views expressed in this paper represent exclusively the
authors’ own opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of the State Bank of Pakistan.
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Incumbent vote share 1972-2005 N = 9 elections
(V )% R2=0.64 Adj. R2=0.51 Root MSE=2.90
Coef. estimate Std. error p-value
Constant β0 43.34 2.33 .0000
Weighted-average 2.16 0.72 .0233
per capita real disposable
personal income growth
rate, % (β1)
Lambda weight (λ) 0.98 0.07 0.0000
Table 2.7: Model Equation Estimates for Quarterly Data without DUR.
Incumbent vote share 1953–2005 N = 13 elections
(V )% R2=0.56 Adj. R2=0.48 Root MSE=4.74
Coef. estimate Std. error p-value
Constant β0 45.34 2.42 .0000
Weighted-average 1.77 0.54 .0086
per capita real disposable
personal income growth
rate, % (β1)
Lag weight (λ) 0.65 0.45 0.1804
Table 2.8: Model Equation Estimates for Yearly Data without DUR.
Variables Units Sources
Incumbent parties vote Percentage share Der Bundeswahlleiter
Personal disposable income Mrd in Euro Statistisches Bundesamt
Population Thousand Statistisches Bundesamt
Consumer price index Base 2000 =100 Deutsche Bundesbank
Gross domestic product Euro Billions Deutsche Bundesbank
Government expenditure Euro Billions Deutsche Bundesbank
Unemployment rate In percent Deutsche Bundesbank
DAX 30 index In percent Deutsche Bundesbank
Table 2.9: Data Variables and Sources.
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2.6 Graphical Representation of Data Series
7.80
7.90
8.00
8.10
8.20
8.30
8.40
8.50
8.60
8.70
1
9
7
0
Q
1
1
9
7
1
Q
3
1
9
7
3
Q
1
1
9
7
4
Q
3
1
9
7
6
Q
1
1
9
7
7
Q
3
1
9
7
9
Q
1
1
9
8
0
Q
3
1
9
8
2
Q
1
1
9
8
3
Q
3
1
9
8
5
Q
1
1
9
8
6
Q
3
1
9
8
8
Q
1
1
9
8
9
Q
3
1
9
9
1
Q
1
1
9
9
2
Q
3
1
9
9
4
Q
1
1
9
9
5
Q
3
1
9
9
7
Q
1
1
9
9
8
Q
3
2
0
0
0
Q
1
2
0
0
1
Q
3
2
0
0
3
Q
1
2
0
0
4
Q
3
L
o
g
 o
f 
re
al
 p
er
 c
ap
it
a 
p
er
so
n
al
 
d
is
p
o
sa
l 
in
co
m
e 
Figure 2.3: Log of Real Per Capita Personal Disposal Income 1970-2005.
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Chapter 3
Pakistan, Politics and Political
Business Cycles
You can fool all the people some of the time, and some of the
people all the time, but you cannot fool all the people all the
time (Abraham Lincoln–American 16th US President, 1861).
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3.1 Introduction
Political business cycle theory formalizes the common perception that politi-
cians use expansionary economic policies in a pre-election period to enhance
their chances of re-election11. Opportunistic politicians are primarily in-
terested in retaining office. When they face an electorate that prefer high
growth, low unemployment and low inflation politicians may use expansion-
ary fiscal or monetary polices to create a short term economic boom before
and during the election campaign. Naive voters are unable to understand
the politician’s manipulation of the economy and its adverse after effects.
On the contrary, they enjoy the boom and re-elect the politician. Because
inexperienced voters are prone to this manipulation, the common view is
that political business cycles are more a phenomenon of less-developed than
developed countries [ (Brender and Drazen,2005b)].
The present study investigates the existence of political business cycles in
case of Pakistan during the period 1973–2009. During this period Pakistan
has undergone seven parliamentarian election terms. Single-country studies
of the political business cycle often suffer from a small number of elections.
However, the political business cycle is a phenomenon that may or may
not occur in a country and a multi-country study is not able to answer the
question if there have been political business cycles in a special country or
not. To proof the existence of a political business cycle in Pakistan, which
is the aim of this study, a single country study is inevitable.
A number of studies have analyzed politically motivated business cy-
cles for both developed and developing countries. Generally, the empiri-
cal political business cycle literature can be divided into three main cat-
egories. The first category attempts to locate political cycles in macroe-
conomic outcomes. These models are been focused, almost exclusively, on
four macroeconomic indicators: growth, inflation, unemployment, and in-
come [Alesina et al. (1999); Andrikopoulos et al. (2004); Grier (2008); Hi-
bbs (1977); Krause (2005); and Suzuki (1992)]. In the short run policy
results on growth and unemployment may not be obvious enough to vot-
ers, so governments may try to stimulate those policy variables that have
direct monetary benefits to voters like government transfers, tax cuts, sub-
11Following the seminal papers by Nordhaus (1975, 1989) and MacRae (1977), many
authors developed a deep understanding in the political business cycle. See Drazen
(2000), Ga¨rtner (2000), Alesina et al. (1992); Alesina (1993), and Paldam (1997) for
surveys, and Blomberg and Hess (2003), Caleiro (2009), Saporiti and Streb (2008) and
Sieg (2006) for current theoretical papers.
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sidies and special employment schemes etc. [Hibbs (2000); Batool and Sieg
(2009b)]. The second major category of political business cycle research con-
centrates on these policy instruments instead of macroeconomic outcomes.
The evidence for this type of a political business cycle is generally stronger
than that for macroeconomic outcomes [Alesina et al. (1999); Coelho et al.
(2006); Drazen (2000); Cerda and Vergara (2008); Keech and Pak (1989)
and Tufte (1978)]. The third major category of research focuses on a unique
policy instrument: monetary policy (also known as the political monetary
cycle). Various studies for many countries are found on central bank mone-
tary policy and political business cycles [Abrams and Iossifov (2006); Beck
(1987); Berger and Woitek (2001); Grier (1987, 1989); Havrilesky (1993);
Maloney et.al. (2003); Persson and Tabellini (2003); Williams (1990) and
Woolley (1994)]. To cover all three categories this study focus on growth,
unemployment, inflation and some fiscal and monetary policy indicators.
Despite plenty of empirical evidence found on political business cycles
for both developed and developing countries, this area of research remains
untouched in case of Pakistan. The present study fills the gap. The chapter
is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the model specification and the
research methodology. Section 3 provides empirical evidence using annual
data from 1973 to 2009 for various macroeconomic variables. Section 4 gives
a summary of our findings and a conclusion.
3.2 Model and Research Methodology
Turning to the empirical literature, politico-economic models have been
tested with a time-series approach. The usual research strategy is to iso-
late a key macroeconomic variable and ascertain whether or not in election
and pre-election years this variable behaves differently than in non-election
years. The earlier procedures entailed simple comparisons of the average
value of the actual unemployment and inflation rates in election and non-
election years, or according to the party in power. Generalizing this ap-
proach, McCallum (1978) and most of those who followed, estimated uni-
variate time series models and tested for shifts in the intercept parameter
[Pack (1987); Keil (1988)]. According to this procedure the impact of the
political sector is viewed as an exogenous intervention in the economic pro-
cess, producing a cyclical (political business cycle) or temporary shift in the
mean value of the time series. Accordingly, the test is for the significance
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of an appropriately defined dummy variable, the intervention variable that
is added to a uni-variate ARMA (ARIMA) representation of the series.
Xt = c+
n∑
p=1
θpXt − p+
m∑
q=1
φqδt − q +
∑
Di + δt (3.1)
To illustrate, let Xt be a variable of interest and assume that Xt can
only be positive and follows a stationary first-order autoregressive moving
average process. Where θ1, . . . , θp in Equation (3.1) are the parameters of
autoregressive terms of the model, while φ1, . . . , φq in Equation (3.1) are
the parameters of moving average terms of the model, c is a constant, and
δt (Equation 3.1) is the error term assumed to be independent identically-
distributed random variables (i.i.d.) sampled from a normal distribution
with zero mean: δt ∼ N(0, σ2) where σ2 is the variance. We begin with
the construction of a benchmark Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA)
models for unemployment and inflation i.e Phillips curve hypothesis. And
Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models for other fis-
cal and monetary policy indicators, as the fiscal and monetary variables
including GDP are integrated of order one. To test the impact of politics
on macroeconomic variables we have defined the following three political
dummy variables:
ED1 =
1, if it is election year0, otherwise
ED2 =
1, if it is election year or one year preceding to a election0, otherwise
ED3 =
1, if it is one year after election0, otherwise
The positive and negative signs of these dummy variables will deter-
mine the positive and negative impact of elections on macroeconomic out-
comes and aggregate demand driven by monetary and fiscal policy instru-
ments. For example, if a government tries to increase growth and employ-
ment before an election and uses expansionary fiscal and monetary policies,
then ED1 or ED2 or both should be positive in the estimated equations
of growth, budget deficit, monetary aggregates and government budgetary
borrowing. If the government adopts a contractionary policy shift in post-
election year, then these instruments show the downward trend that can be
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measured by a negative sign of ED3. It should however be noted that in
case of inflation and unemployment, pre-electoral variables should denote
decrease and should have negative signs, while the post-election variables
should have a positive sign to reflect the impact of pre-election expansionary
policies.
Quarterly or high frequency data is recommended to investigate the issue
of political business cycle. But in case of Pakistan, the national accounts
and unemployment data is available only in annual frequency. Therefore we
have used the annual time series data from 1973–200912 for the proposed
variables. The underlying study period covers seven elections: 1977; 1988;
1990; 1993; 1997; 2002 and 2008. The election dates and corresponding
fiscal years are shown in Table 3.6.
3.3 Empirical Results
First we test predictions of the classic opportunistic political cycle model by
Nordhaus (1975). The model predicts political manipulation in unemploy-
ment and inflation. Analogical political behavior implies cycles in macroeco-
nomic variables such as growth, money supply, fiscal deficit, and budgetary
borrowing etc.
3.3.1 Unemployment, Inflation and Opportunistic Busi-
ness Cycle
Estimated ARMA model results in Table 3.1 show that ED2 is significant
and has a negative sign. During the election year and one year prior to the
election year the unemployment rate was reduced by 19 percent in compari-
son to other years. The political dummy variable ED3 for the post-election
year is positive but not statistically significant. This result may attribute
to the switch from expansionary to contractionary policy when an incum-
bent party wins the election, and cancellation of old employment generation
schemes if the opposition is elected into office. Both results fully support
the political business cycle theories.
Inflation is another important key to understand the political business
cycles. Election periods cause great sensitivity on the side of the govern-
ment to keep quiet about increases of regulated prices by deferring them
12Before 1971, the present Bangladesh was a part of Pakistan called West Pakistan.
Therefore, we have excluded the earlier time period from the analysis.
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Table 3.1: Unemployment, Inflation and Political Business Cycles.
Variables Unemployment Inflation
Constant 1.1133*** 0.0864*** 0.0769***
Deterministic trend 0.0265***
AR(1) 0.9522*** 0.6029*** 0.4767***
AR(2) -0.3255*
MA(1)
MA(5) -0.8984*** -0.8885***
MA(7) -0.9027***
MA(8)
ED1 -0.0228***
ED2 -0.1911***
ED3 0.0207 0.0033 0.0157**
n 35 35 35
R2 0.95 0.74 0.66
D.W stat 1.97 1.88 1.97
S.EE 0.10 0.102 0.026
***, ** and * denote rejection of null hypothesis at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level of siginificance respectively.
Unemployment rate has been taken in logarithmic form.
to the post-election period. Thus, after each election it is common to hear
oppositional parties accusing the returned party for exploiting the myopic
expectations of voters to boost their probability of winning the election.
However, if the incumbent party looses the election despite deferring price
increases, then the winning party would again accuse the former incumbent
party for leaving a huge economic burden by not increasing the regulated
prices. This has to be fulfilled by the new government who would immedi-
ately receive a negative point in its honeymoon period.
Estimated ARIMA model for inflation in Table 3.1 shows ED1 with a
negative sign, that means during the pre-election year the inflation has been
kept lower by 2.2 percentage points in comparison to other years.
Non-realized price increases in regulated sectors are subsidized by the
government through deficit financing. Consequently, the budget deficit rises
and creates an inflationary pressure and debt sustainability problem in the
post-election period. The post-election year dummy variable found to be
insignificant, however if we estimate the ARIMA model and incorporate
only the post-election year dummy and ignore the pre-election effect then
the post election dummy is found to be statistically significant (see Table
3.1, column 4).
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Table 3.2: Fiscal and Monetary Variables and Opportunistic Business Cycle.
Variables Real GDP Real Government Fiscal Deficit
Growth Investment Growth as percent of GDP
Constant 0.0619*** 0.0919*** 1.6219***
AR(1) -0.7198**
MA(2) 0.2968***
MA(4) 0.1919**
MA(5) -0.8061*** -0.9544***
MA(6) -0.8820***
MA(9) -0.857***
ED1 -0.1434*** 0.1423***
ED2 -0.014***
ED3 -0.032*** -0.1351***
n 36 36 36
R2 0.50 0.68 0.65
D.W stat 2.05 1.61 2.22
S.EE 0.015 0.07 0.17
***, ** and * denote rejection of null hypothesis at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level of siginificance respectively.
Both unemployment and inflation results are consistent with the pre-
election political manipulation as the politicians try to maximize their chance
of re-election by increasing the employment conditions and controlling the
inflation artificially during the election and prior to the election period.
But the post-election year dummy variables are found to be statistically in-
significant but have correct signs, employing that post election effect is less
pronounced. The evidence supports the argument by Ginsburgh and Michel
(1983), pointing the fact that if there is government fall and resultant early
election as in case of Pakistan in 1990, 1993 and 1997 before the legal term,
the political business cycles would be less pronounced.
The GDP growth estimated ARIMA model (see Table 3.2) does not pro-
vide any supporting evidence for the Nordhaus (1975) opportunistic busi-
ness cycle theory as political variable ED1 and ED3 both estimated to be
negative i.e. have the wrong sign. Miss-allocation of resources during and
after the election period could be the reason. Although the results seems
to be fine to some extent, there is concern regarding the stationarity of the
variable series raised by Enders (2004). The basic underlying assumption of
the ARMA model is the stationarity of the variable over time. However a
simple ADF/DF test shows that inflation and GDP growth are stationary at
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level, while the unemployment is found to be integrated of order one which
makes the unemployment ARMA model results suspicious. Therefore, the
discussion remains inconclusive and there is a need to further exploration
of the phenomena.
3.3.2 Fiscal and Monetary Variables and Opportunis-
tic Business Cycle
The original opportunistic business cycle model by Nordhaus (1975) focuses
on political cycles in inflation, employment and growth which are induced
by monetary policy. However, Rogoff (1990) model is grounded in the use
of fiscal policy tools. Recently, Drazen (2000) has argued that PBC mod-
els based on monetary surprises are unconvincing, because of their implicit
assumption that the incumbent party directly controls the monetary pol-
icy.13 Instead Drazen (2000) builds on Rogoff (1990) to derive a model in
which PBC arises from active fiscal policy interventions that are later ac-
commodated by the monetary expansions. Various empirical studies are in
line with this approach that have been carried out on monetary and fiscal
budget political cycles [Brender and Drazen (2008)]. Following Schuknecht
(1996) we have focused on fiscal deficit, government investment, monetary
aggregate (M2) and government budgetary borrowing. We have first ap-
plied the unit root test to test the stationarity assumption of the variables.
The ADF results show that all variables are integrated of order one that
requires 1st difference for the series to be stationary (see Table 3.5). In a
second step we have estimated the parsimonious ARIMA model for these
fiscal and monetary variables. The results are shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3.
The ARIMA model result for real government investment states that
ED1 and ED3 are both negative which implies that government investment
has declined by 14 percent (13 percent) during the election (post-election)
year. In contrast, the pre-electoral variable ED1 is positive in the bud-
get deficit as percentage of GDP equation, which can quantify a 14 per-
cent increase in the budget deficit during the election year. This may be
attributed to the fact that during the election campaign the government
uses expansionary policies and spends more on current expenditures like
tax cuts, subsidies, price supports and election campaigns etc. and not on
investment. These current expenditures helps the government to realize
13See, however, Sieg (1997), for monetary cycles even if central banks are independent.
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Table 3.3: Fiscal and Monetary Variables and Opportunistic Business Cy-
cles.
Variables Net Government Budgetary Government Budgetary Broad Money
Borrowing (growth) Borrowing from Supply (M2)
Banking Sector(growth) (growth)
Constant 0.1060*** 0.1085*** 0.1339***
AR(5) -0.5937***
AR(10) -0.4828*** -0.8654***
MA(1) 0.3088**
MA(3) 0.3077** 0.8353***
MA(4) 0.8605***
MA(5) -0.987***
ED1 0.1196*** 0.1381*** 0.0481***
ED3 -0.077*** -0.0233**
n 26 26 35
R2 0.62 0.59 0.59
D.W stat 2.23 1.85 2.05
S.EE 0.08 0.08 0.03
***, ** and * denote rejection of null hypothesis at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level of siginificance respectively.
their short term objective i.e. collect votes, but do not have any significant
impact on macroeconomic growth.
Such fiscal deficits are financed by internal or external sources espe-
cially accommodated by the countries banks and create additional impact
on monetary policy variables. In this regard we have expanded our ana-
lytical framework to the monetary sector by including M2, net government
budgetary borrowing and budgetary borrowing from the banking sector.
The ARIMA model results show that ED1 has the expected signs in
case of net government budgetary borrowing and borrowing from the bank-
ing sector, showing 11 percent and 13 percent increase during the election
years (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3). Both effects demonstrate clear patterns of
opportunistic politically motivated fiscal expansion accommodated by the
monetary sector. These type of government borrowing can cause a sudden
rise in money supply and induce inflationary pressures in the economy. Es-
timated ARIMA model results for M2 confirm this monetary expansion as
it registered a 4 percent rise during the same period. However this is less
than the rise in the budgetary borrowing, this may be due to the fact that
Pakistan’s current M2 definition has two main components: Net Domestic
Assets (NDA) and Net Foreign Assets (NFA). Therefore, it might be pos-
sible that the budgetary borrowing rise is offset by the contraction in the
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other component such as NFA, and not exactly depicted in the M2 expan-
sion. During the post-election year, M2 growth registered a contraction by
approximately the same percentage (2 percent), consistent to (7 percent)
decline in the budgetary borrowing from the banking sector, representing
a tight monetary stance taken to curtail the inflation in the post-election
year.
3.4 Conclusion
Inexperienced voters are a well known breeding ground for opportunistic
political business cycles. In this study we proved that Pakistan’s society
suffers from such political motivated inefficient economic policies. We have
used annual data for unemployment, inflation, growth and other macroe-
conomic indicators for the period 1973–2009. The study has used simple
intervention analysis in the time series data to examine the fluctuations dur-
ing the election and non-election years. Results show that unemployment
rate has been significantly reduced during the election and one year before
the election year. Inflation shows similar patterns as during the election
period it is kept down by 2.2 percent. The reason could be that the ruling
party keep the regulated prices artificially low before election and delays
the cost push inflation by the post-election period. This is consistent with
the recent surge in energy prices in Pakistan, where just after the election
of 2008 the government cut all the subsides and raised energy prices that
has been deliberately kept low up to the end of the election. However the
post election manipulation is absent or we can say less pronounced in both
unemployment and inflation case.
On the fiscal side we have seen an increase in the budget deficit accom-
modated by net government budgetary borrowings and borrowing from the
banking sector resulting in monetary expansion and inflationary pressure in
the economy during the election year. To summarize, our findings of sub-
stantial electorally motivated policy distortions without associated impacts
on real GDP and investment suggest that Pakistan’s society pays the cost
of political business cycles but realizes none of the benefits.
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Name Description Unit Sources
U log(Unemployment rate) In percentage Labor Force Survey
P log(consumer price index) Base at 1999–00 State Bank of Pakistan
Y log(Real GDP) Base at 1999–00 State Bank of Pakistan
prices
Ig log(Real government investment) Base at1999–00 State Bank of Pakistan
Gbbn log(Net government budgetary
borrowing) PKR in millions State Bank of Pakistan
Gbbs log(Government budgetary
borrowing from the
banking Sector) PKR in millions State Bank of Pakistan
M2 log(Broad money supply) PKR in millions State Bank of Pakistan
Fisb log(Fiscal deficit as %age of GDP) PKR in millions State Bank of Pakistan
Table 3.4: Data Variables and Sources.
Variable Series DF/ADF Test Value lag Deterministic Decision
U -1.917812 0 c I(1)
∆P -3.606487** 0 c Stationary
∆Y -3.942443*** 0 c Stationary
∆Ig -4.520618*** 1 c Stationary
∆Gbbn -3.640938*** 0 c Stationary
∆Gbbs -5.019487*** 0 c Stationary
∆M2 -3.456143** 5 c Stationary
Fisb -3.3672* 0 c,t Stationary
Table 3.5: Unit Root Test Results.
Corresponding
Election Date Fiscal Year
General Elections 1977 January 7, March 7 and 10, 1977; 1976–77
Legislative Elections 1988 November 16, 1988 1987–88
General Elections 1990 October 29, 1990 1989–90
General Elections 1993 October 6, 1993 1992–93
General Elections 1997 February 3, 1997 1996–1997
General Elections 2002 October 10, 2002 2001–2002
General Elections 2008 February 18, 2008 2007–2008
Table 3.6: Election Dates.
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3.5 Graphical Representation of the Data Se-
ries
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Figure 3.1: Log of Unemployment Rate 1973–2009.
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Figure 3.2: Log of Fiscal Deficit as % of GDP 1973–2009.
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Figure 3.3: Log of Consumer Price Index 1973–2009.
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Figure 3.5: Log of Real GDP 1973–2009.
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Figure 3.6: Real GDP Growth 1973–2009.
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Figure 3.7: Log of Real Government Investment 1973–2009.
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Figure 3.8: Real Government Investment Growth 1973–2009.
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Figure 3.9: Log of Net Government Budgetary Borrowing 1973–2009.
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Figure 3.10: Net Government Budgetary Borrowing Growth 1973–2009.
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Figure 3.11: Log of Budgetary Government Borrowings from Banking Sector
1973–2009.
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Figure 3.12: Growth of Government Budgetary Borrowing from Banking
Sector 1973–2009.
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Figure 3.13: Log of Money Supply (M2)1973–2009.
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Figure 3.14: Money Supply (M2) Growth 1973–2009.
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The only good central bank is one that can say No to politicians
(The Economist, February 10, 1990).
55
Chapter 4 Pakistan Central Bank Independence and Electoral Politics
4.1 Introduction
The opportunistic political cycle models, pioneered by Nordhaus (1975),
hold that incumbent politicians regardless of their party affiliation, try to
maximize their chances for reelection by creating a favorable macroeco-
nomic environment in run-up to elections. For this opportunistic version
of the political business cycle to be reasonably motivated, incumbent presi-
dents/parties must believe that the electorate rewards the incumbent (or the
incumbent’s party) for favorable economic conditions prior to the election.
Although the rationality for the electorate to do this has been questioned
Stigler (1973), empirical evidence suggests that favorable economic condi-
tions (i.e. rising income and/or low unemployment rates) in the run-up
to elections do garner more votes for the incumbent president or his party
[Abrams, (1980); Abrams and Butkiewicz (1995); Alesina (1993); Blomberg
and Hess (2003); Erikson (1989); Fair (1978); Fair (1982) and Fair (1996)].
Thus, the empirical evidence provides a clear motive for a president or for
the incumbent president’s party to nurture an opportunistic political busi-
ness cycle with the help of fiscal or monetary accommodation.
While the incumbent has a motive for encouraging an opportunistic
political monetary cycle (PMC) little evidence of the use of monetary policy
tools to support such a cycle has been uncovered for either the United States,
OECD and other developing countries [Alesina and Roubini (1992); Allen
and Mc.Crickard (1991); Beck (1987); Berger and Woitek (2001); Boschen
and Weise (2003); Grier (1987); Grier (1989); Golden and Poterba (1980);
Heckelman and Wood (2005); Leertouwer and Maier (2001) and Williams
(1990)].
The empirical evidence on the use of monetary policy tools to support
opportunistic PMCs have been further investigated under partisan affilia-
tions and central bank independence context. Abrams and Iossifov (2006);
Sieg (1997); Sieg (2006) and Ferris (2008) support the existence of PMCs
only when the central bank chair and incumbent presidential party has par-
tisan affiliations. In contrast Alpenda and Honig (2009), Hadri and Maloney
(1998) and Maloney et.al. (2003) validate the existence of PMCs not because
of the partisan affiliations but due to the lack of central bank independence
as they are more vulnerable to the political pressure.
In this study our focus is on the existence of the PMCs keeping in view
the Pakistan central bank independence during the period 1985–2010. We
found that Pakistan central bank is not free from the political pressures as
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its monetary policy is expansionary in run-up to election periods, consistent
to the rising fiscal deficit trend and ever growing deficit financing by the
banking sources during the same period.
The chapter proceeds as follows, section 2 characterizes the salient fea-
tures of monetary policy in Pakistan. Section 3 provides a brief look on the
political and economic independence of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP)
during the underlying period. Section 4 derives the central bank reactions
function in view of its monetary policy and discusses the empirical results.
The final section summarizes the findings and concludes.
4.2 State Bank Monetary Policy
Under the State Bank Act 1956, the State Bank of Pakistan, the central
bank, was established to regulate the monetary and credit system in the
economy to foster its growth with a view to secure monetary stability and
fuller utilization of the country’s productive resources [SBP ACT (1956)].
Furthermore, section 9A.1 of the State Bank Act 1956 elaborates the tar-
gets of monetary policy in Pakistan. It states that the target rates of GDP
growth and inflation set by the federal government are the goals of mone-
tary policy. Therefore the goals of the monetary policy in Pakistan are to
achieve the target rates of growth and inflation that are set by the federal
government.
SBP monetary policy comprises of market and non-market based instru-
ment sets, such as direct credit control, interest rate (discount rate), T-bill
auction rate, Open Market Operations (OMO) in the government securities
and other eligible assets, statutory reserve requirement and statutory liq-
uidity ratio etc. Under the direct instruments, the bank can prescribe credit
ceiling, set credit/deposit ration, fix margin requirements, and control the
rate of return. It can also direct the banks to restrict credit for certain pur-
poses as well as to direct the flow of credit to priority sectors. Before 1990,
State Bank of Pakistan used to conduct monetary and credit policies by
applying mostly direct instruments. Since 1990–91, with the introduction
of financial sector reforms, SBP has been focusing on the indirect measures
to control the monetary policy (Arby,2004).
A number of changes have been made to move towards indirect and
market based monetary management. As a major step in this direction,
the prescription of credit ceilings, as an instrument of credit control, was
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abolished in August 1992 and was replaced by a system which required the
commercial banks to extend credit to the private sector within limits worked
out on quarterly basis in relation to a credit/deposit ratio. Thereafter, the
credit/deposit ratio was liberalized gradually. It was abolished completely
w.e.f. October 1995. Now the monetary management is carried out through
changes in the discount rate, T-bill auction rate, Open Market Operations
and Reserve requirement.
Assuming the stability of money demand function, SBP targets the
growth of money (M2) and accordingly made desired adjustments in its
intermediate instruments e.g. discount rate, cash reserve and cash liquidity
requirement on deposits etc. Similarly, annual credit plan is made consid-
ering the sectoral requirements of credit in the country14. It is implicitly
assumed by the SBP that M2 and inflation are effectively controlled by the
effective use of these monetary policy instruments. In this study our primary
focus is on the SBP bank rate (discount rate) as the principle instrument
of monetary policy in practice nowadays.
4.3 Pakistan Central Bank Independence
It has been witnessed that political monetary cycles depend upon the op-
portunistic politicians as well as on the political and economic independence
of the country’s central bank. Independent central banks are less likely to
be involved in electorally motivated policies than central banks that are un-
der the spell of the government15. The idea is that the insulating monetary
policy from the politician’s direct control and by appointing a conservative
(i.e. inflation-averse) central banker, one can reduce inflation from a level
that is too high because of the policy makers (opportunistic or partisan)
fruitless attempt to reduce average unemployment. In other words, inde-
pendent central banks are a means of achieving credibility in policy making
and insulating the monetary policy from political pressures, thus reducing
the average and variability of inflation, possibly at low cost in increased
real fluctuations [Alesina et al. (1997); Hadri and Maloney (1998); Alesina
and Summers (1993)]. In response to these findings, countries all over the
14Now the SBP has discontinued the exercise of the formulation of annual credit plans
since year 2006.
15Waller (1989) and Fratianni et.al. (1997) present formal models of the benefit from
central bank independence in partisan models. Eijffinger and Haan (1996) provides a
survey of the political economy of central bank independence.
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world have adopted independent central banks, or granted their pre-existing
central banks a higher degree of independence.
There are two types of independence : economic independence and po-
litical independence. Economic independence means “the autonomy of the
central bank in choosing the instruments of monetary policy”, and political
independence means “the freedom of the central bank to choose the goals
of monetary policy [Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), p. 366-368].
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) measured economic indepen-
dence by two key institutional factors: the first one is the influence of the
government in determining how much of the fiscal deficit will be monetized,
and the second is the autonomy of the central bank in controlling the mon-
etary instruments and banking supervision. On the other hand, political
or goal independence is determined by three institutional factors: (1) the
procedure for appointing members of the central bank governing body; (2)
the legal relationship of the central bank with the government and (3) the
formal legal responsibilities of the central bank (see details in Table 4.1; and
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991)).
In Pakistan, the policy move towards the central bank independence has
been started during the 1990s decade. In February 1994, a bill has been
passed, accordingly the sole responsibility of the formulation of monetary
policy has been given to SBP. More specifically, the Central Board (CB) of
the SBP was given larger responsibility to regulate and supervise monetary
and credit system keeping in view the national policy objectives of the
government.
On January 1997, the State Bank of Pakistan was further amended to
strengthen autonomy of the Bank. According to the amended section 9-A of
the Act, the CB would in order to secure monetary stability and soundness
of the financial system, formulate and monitor credit policy. In doing so
the SBP would take into account the federal government targets for growth,
inflation and expected changes in net foreign assets of the banking system
and would ensure that monetary and credit policy is conducted in a manner
which was consistent with these targets. The CB would also determine and
enforce, in addition to the overall expansion of liquidity, the limit of credit to
be extended by the SBP to the federal government, provincial government
and other agencies of the federal and provincial governments for all purposes.
It would also estimate the credit requirements by the private sector and
would intimate the same to the Monetary and Fiscal Policies Co-ordination
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Board (MFPCB). More importantly, it would submit a quarterly report to
the parliament on the state of the economy with special reference to the
economic growth, money supply and credit, balance of payments and price
developments.
According to the amended section 9-B, MFPCB would determine the
extent of government borrowing from commercial banks taking into account
the credit requirements of the private sector and liquidity expansion as
determined by the CB. Similarly, in the amended Section 46-B, it has been
prescribed that no governmental or quasi governmental body or agency
shall issue any directive, directly or indirectly, to any banking company or
any other financial institutions regulated by the SBP which is inconsistent
with the policies, regulations and directives issued by the SBP pursuant
to this Act, the Banking Companies Ordinance of 1962 or any other law
in force. Moreover, the sole authority and responsibility to supervise and
regulate the activities of nationalized commercial banks have been given to
the State Bank of Pakistan.
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Figure 4.1: Political and Economic Independence of Central Banks.
To measure the SBP political and economic independence, we have fol-
lowed the approach devised by Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991). We
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have updated and extended this analysis to some other developing countries
such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Thailand. The total number of
“No” answers under the political independence head determines the rank-
ing of central bank political independence i.e. “3” in case of Pakistan. While
the total number of “Yes” answers under the economic independence head
determine the central bank economic independence i.e. turned out to be
“1” in the present scenario (see details in Table 4.1).
Figure 4.1 summarizes Tables 4.5 and 4.6 showing the overall degree
of economic and political independence of the 22 countries including Pak-
istan. There are four groups of the countries. The upper-right portion of
the diagram have the most independent central banks, those which enjoy
both political and economic independence. The countries on the lower-left
portion have the least independent central banks, both economically and
politically16. The remaining two groups of countries are in between, with
monetary institutions independent in only one of the two dimensions. Other
politically unstable countries also have unsustainable debt policies (Austria,
Belgium, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands), but they have relatively in-
dependent central banks, at least on one dimension.
Despite various amendments and reforms initiated, it has been observed
that SBP is still infant on the path of autonomy. The analysis of political
and economic independence attributes presented in Table 4.1 suggest that
Pakistan central bank lies among the least independent central banks. The
main root cause is its consistently rising trend of fiscal deficit as percent
of GDP during the period 1985–2010 (see Figure 4.2). This situation can
be clearly visualized by comparing the target and actual values of deficit
financing by the banking sources. It has been witnessed that most of the
time Pakistan government has breached its borrowing limit that clearly
indicates that SBP is under pressure to fulfill the government deficit gap
(see Figure 4.3).17
16However now the economic independence of the countries in the Euro-zone is linked
with the principle that is stated in in the Treaty establishing the European Community
(article 108), which says that neither the ECB nor a national central bank shall seek or
take instructions from Community institutions, from any government of a member state
or from any other body. But still Greece, Portugal and Spain are considered to fall in
this category.
17Except the period 1999–2003, during this period government has privatized some of
the public owned institutions and received privatization proceeds, therefore have enough
money and government also retired some of the borrowed money from the SBP. In addi-
tion, due to 9/11 event, Pakistan has accumulated foreign reserves in terms of remittances
from abroad.
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Figure 4.2: Pakistan Fiscal Deficit 1985–2010.
In view of the above discussed scenario, one may suspect the presence
and existence of political monetary cycles in case of Pakistan. The empir-
ical evidence supporting the presence of PMCs in multi-country or panel
data set generalize the findings all over the countries, however less helpful
in determining the nature and significance of it for some specific country.
Therefore the single country analysis such like this is more recommendable
and economically worthwhile.
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Figure 4.3: Pakistan Deficit Financing by Banking Sources 1985–2010.
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4.4 Monetary Policy Reaction Functions and
Empirical Results
4.4.1 Interest Rate Reaction Function and Elections
Following Abrams and Iossifov (2006) we estimate a Taylor type equation for
the period 1985Q1–2010Q4 using OLS method18. Our dependent variable is
the quarterly average for the discount rate (DISR). Explanatory variables
initially include the year-to-year inflation rate (pi) and the real GDP output
gap (RGDPGAP ). It is expected that the signs on inflation and real output
gap are positive as both higher inflation rates and higher output gaps (i.e.,
real output above potential real GDP) are expected to encourage monetary
tightening by the SBP (i.e., the setting of higher rates for DISR). The
DISR lagged one quarter, DISR(−1), enters the models as a RHS variable
to allow interest-rate smoothing behavior by the central bank. It should be
noted that interest rate smoothing may in itself be apolitical cause of the
monetary cycle as stated by Laney and Willet (1983) and Ferris (2008).
DISRt = α + βpit + γRGDPGAPt + φDISRt−1 + δpolDi + ϑt (4.1)
The findings for the Equation (4.1) specification appear in model 1, Ta-
ble 4.2. Estimated results show that whenever there is rise in inflation and
real GDP output gap, SBP tightens the monetary policy by increasing the
interest rate. Despite its simplicity, model 2 in Table 4.2, explains 94 per-
cent of the variation in DISR. DISR(−1) proved to be highly significant,
consistent with the widely acknowledged interest-rate smoothing behavior
by the SBP. We used model 2 as the baseline OLS model for the preliminary
testing of propositions concerning the existence of a PMC.
All the data series have been extracted from the International Financial
Statistics (IFS) electronic data source.
1. Discount rate (DISR) is the quarterly discount rate series extracted
from the IFS data source.
18For the interest rate as the linear function of inflation and real output gap as specified
by the Taylor (DISR = βpit+γRGDPGAPt), OLS test results are super consistent as the
residuals obtained from the estimated regression equation are stationary (see in Figure
4.8)
64
Chapter 4 Pakistan Central Bank Independence and Electoral Politics
2. The inflation rate is calculated as the growth rate of quarterly aver-
ages of monthly published data on CPI (annualized, in percent):
pit = 4× 100× (lnCPIt − lnCPIt−1),
where CPI is the Consumer Price Index extracted from the electronic
data source of IFS.
3. The output gap is calculated as
RGDPGAP = 4× 100× [ln(mpit)− hptrend(ln(mpit)],
where the mpi is the quarterly manufacturing production index and
hptrend(lnmpi) is the potential manufacturing production index, cal-
culated by hp filter method.
4. The GDP growth rate has been calculated as
GDPgrowth = [ln(mpit − ln(mpit−1)]× 4× 100.
5. D1 is defined as equal to ‘1’ in the election quarter and ‘0’ otherwise,
and D2 defined as equal to ‘1’ in the election quarter and one quarter
prior to election, and ‘0’ otherwise. Similarly D21 is equal to ‘1’ in the
pre-election quarter and ‘0’ otherwise.
If the SBP is under government pressure to improve economic conditions
in the run-up to elections, we should be able to find evidence that the
discount rate deviates from the Taylor’s rule during some period prior or
during the election quarters. Since a reduction in theDISR would stimulate
the economy, we seek to test whether or not the DISR is lower in some
period prior or during the election period. To this end, we construct some
dummy variables: Di that takes on a value of ‘1’ in ith quarters prior to
or during the election occurs, and ‘0’ otherwise. A negative and significant
coefficient on Di would support the existence of PMC hypothesis.
Model 3 and 4 in Table 4.2 adds the political dummies to the baseline
monetary policy rule. These dummies are found to be negative and signifi-
cant, showing that SBP eases the monetary policy by reducing the interest
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Model/Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
C 0.02
(0.06)
INF 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.065
(4.27) (5.24) (4.50) (4.47)
RGDPGAP 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005
(2.92) (2.62) (3.19) (2.94)
DISR(−1) 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
(85.63) (87.15) (86.42) (85.86)
D1 -0.57
(-1.68)
D2 -0.32
(-1.28)
R-squared 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
Adjusted R-squared 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
Serial Correlation LM test Prob.(χ2) 0.56 0.55 0.52 0.58
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.91 1.96 1.88 1.89
Table 4.2: Determinants of the SBP Discount Rate, DISR, 1985Q1–
2010Q4.
rates by 57 and 32 percentage points in the election quarter and two quar-
ters proceeding to election respectively. The timing of the dummy variable
confirms the assumption commonly made in the literature, that voters de-
cide on whether to vote for the candidate of the party of the incumbent
president, based on the state of the economy in the last quarter prior to the
election quarter [Faust and Irons (1999)].
If we compare our results with the Abrams and Iossifov (2006) study,
we found that SBP reaction to inflation is about one half in magnitude
and reaction to RGDPGAP is rather more weak than estimated in Fed’s
reaction function. These results are practically justified as SBP being the
central bank of a developing country and lagged behind in tightening of
the monetary policy than Fed. Similarly the lagged interest rate coefficient
magnitudes turned out to be higher than in the case of Fed reaction function.
4.4.2 Modified Interest Rate Reaction Function
The estimated reaction function states that SBP tightens its monetary pol-
icy whenever the real output gap and inflation rises, however the coefficient
magnitude of the output gap is rather small. The reason behind this may
be that the SBP conducts its monetary policy by focusing on the inflation
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Model/Explanatory (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
variables
C 0.07
(0.23)
INF 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
(3.52) (3.81) (4.07) (4.18) (4.34) (4.37)
GDP growth 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
(1.65) (1.72) (2.14) (2.06)
RGDPGAP 0.005 0.005
(3.00) (3.05)
DISR(−1) 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
(37.3) (83.4) (84.1) (83.8) (85.92) 85.59)
D1 -0.61
(-1.69)
D2 -0.44
(-1.66)
Dm -0.63
(-1.35)
Dc -0.46
(-0.96)
R-squared 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
Adjusted R-squared 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.94
Serial Correlation
LM test Prob.(χ2) 0.42 0.42 0.38 0.48 0.69 0.38
Durbin-Watson stat 1.84 1.86 1.82 1.84 1.98 1.83
Table 4.3: Determinants of the SBP Discount Rate, DISR, 1985Q1–
2010Q4.
and GDP growth targets announced by the federal government. Therefore,
the estimated (Taylor type) interest rate reaction function should consist of
GDP growth instead of real output gap. Here we have modified our interest
reaction function as specified below.
DISRt = α + βpit + γGDPgrowtht + φDISRt−1 + δpolDi + ϑt (4.2)
The results obtained from Equation 4.2 appears in Table 4.3. It has
been seen that whenever there is rise in inflation and real GDP growth, SBP
reacts by increasing the interest rate. Lagged interest rate coefficient shows
the similar interest rate smoothing behavior as in the previous case. The
overall model explains 94 percent variations in the discount rate, however
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the main part comes from the lagged interest rate. Model. 2 in Table 4.3
has been used as the baseline OLS model to test the PMCs hypothesis.
The political dummies are found to be negative and significant, showing
the result that SBP eases the monetary policy by reducing the interest rate
in the election quarter and two quarters preceding election (by 61 and 44
percentage points respectively). The negative and significant coefficients on
political dummies support the existence of PMC hypothesis.
To test the model robustness we have also estimated the models by us-
ing the GMM (Generalized Method of Moments). All variables are found
to be the same in terms of coefficient values and significance, showing the
robustness of the results (see Table 4.4). We have also included the two lags
of explanatory and dependent variables but found to be insignificant. More-
over, their exclusion does not cause any change in coefficients magnitude
and significance of the remaining explanatory variables in the models.
Model/Explanatory (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
variables
INF 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06
(5.10) (5.05) (5.03) (4.28) (4.39) (4.60)
RGDPGAP 0.005 0.005 0.005
(2.69) (2.74) (2.72)
GDP growth 0.002 0.003 0.003
(1.91) (2.33) (2.43)
DISR(−1) 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
(88.9) (90.5) (89.2) (81.5) (83.3) (83.9)
D1 -0.58 -0.61
(-2.44) (-2.51)
D2 -0.30 -0.42
(-0.98) (-1.30)
R-squared 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
Adjusted R-squared 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.93
Durbin-Watson stat 1.91 1.88 1.90 1.86 1.82 1.84
J-Statistic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 4.4: Determinants of the SBP Discount Rate, DISR, 1985Q1–2010Q4
(GMM Estimates).
These evidences are consistent to the findings as described by Alpenda
and Honig (2007), as the ranking given to the Pakistan central bank is 44
among the sample of 55 countries and 86th among the sample of 115 coun-
tries, in terms of independence depending upon the existence of political
monetary business cycles. The higher the ranking, the more central bank
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is prone to political pressure to induce the electoral monetary cycles [see
details in Alpenda and Honig (2007)].
4.4.3 Tests for Military and Civilian Government Spe-
cific PMCs
During the study period 1985–2010, six elections were held. The country
was ruled by two military and three civilian governments. During the elec-
tion terms 1989, 2002 and 2008, the incumbent president came through the
military government. During 1990, 1993, and 1997 election terms the pres-
ident is the part of the civilian government. In both cases, the authority
enjoyed by the presidents may be different. This leads to the question “Are
military and civilian governments are equally responsible for creating the
PMCs in case of Pakistan? To test this hypothesis, Table 4.3, model 6 and
7 substitutes the political dummies D1 and D2 by the separate political
dummy variables i.e. Dm dummy for military government and Dc dummy
for civilian governments. Here Dm is equal to 1 for the election 1988, 2002
and 2008, and 0 otherwise. While the Dc is equal to 1 for the election 1990,
1993, and 1997 and 1 otherwise. The estimated results explain that both
military and civilian government dummies are found to be negative show-
ing the same opportunistic political behavior but statistically insignificant
(see Table 4.3; Model.5 and 6). It may be due to the limited number of
values (election terms) under both governments. Blais and Nadeau (1992)
attributed such type of non-existence of electoral cycles to the scant num-
ber of time series observations available, where the coefficients on the key
variables are often of the predicted sign, although they lack of statistical
significance.
4.5 Conclusion
Despite various reforms regarding the central bank independence under-
taken during the 1990s decade, it has been witnessed that Pakistan central
bank (SBP) is not among the list of political and economically independent
central banks of the world. Acknowledging this fact, central bank inter-
est rate reaction (Taylor Type) function with some political variables has
been estimated to investigate the existence of PMCs in Pakistan during
the period 1985Q1–2010Q4. Although the existence of Taylor type rule is
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controversial in Pakistan, the estimated interest rate reaction function fol-
lows the conventional wisdom and demonstrates the tightening of monetary
policy by SBP whenever the output gap/GDP growth and inflation rises in
the economy. The pre-election dummy variables found to be negative and
significant, that support the existence of PMCs during the underlying pe-
riod. Our results are in line with the findings of Batool and Sieg (2009b) and
Alpenda and Honig (2009) who demonstrate the existence of electoral cycles
in monetary policy and PMCs existence attributed to developing countries
central bank non-independence.
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Table 4.5: Political Independence of Central Banks.
Relationship Index of
with political
Appointments government Constitution independence
Countries (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Australia * * * 3
Austria * * * 3
Belgium * 1
Canada * * * * 4
Denmark * * * 3
France * * * * 4
Germany * * * * * * 6
Greece * * 2
Ireland * * * 3
Italy * * * * 4
Japan * * * 3
Netherlands * * * * * * 6
New Zealand * * * * 4
Portugal * 1
Spain * * 2
Switzerland * * * * * 5
UK * 1
US * * * * * 5
Pakistan * * * 3
India * * * 3
Bangladesh * 1
Thailand * * 2
Notes: (1) Governor not appointed by the government; (2) Governor appointed for > 5 years; (3)
All the Board not appointed by the government; (4) Board appointed for > 5 years; (5) No mandatory
participation of government representative in the Board; (6) No government approval of monetary policy
formulation is required; (7) Statutory requirements that central bank pursues monetary stability among
its goals; (8) Legal provisions that strengthen the central bank’s position in conflicts with the government
are present; (9) Overall index of political independence, constructed as the sum of the asterisks in each
row. Source: Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991); Countries National Legislations; Table 4.1.
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Table 4.6: Economic Independence of Central Banks.
Index of
Monetary financing of Monetary economic
budget deficit instruments independence
Countries (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Australia * * * * * * 6
Austria * * * * ** 6
Belgium * * * * ** 6
Canada * * * * * ** 7
Denmark * * * ** 5
France * * * ** 5
Germany * * * * * * * 7
Greece * * 2
Ireland * * * * 4
Italy * 1
Japan * * * * * 5
Netherlands * * * * 4
New Zealand * * * * * 5
Portugal * * 2
Spain * * * 3
Switzerland * * * * * ** 7
UK * * * * * * 6
US * * * * * * * 7
Pakistan * 1
India * 1
Bangladesh * 1
Thailand * 1
Notes:(1) Direct credit facility: not automatic; (2) Direct credit facility: market interest rate; (3) Direct
credit facility: temporary; (4)Direct credit facility: limited amount; (5) Central bank does not participate
in primary market for public debt; (6)Discount rate set by the central bank;(7)banking supervision not
entrusted to the central bank(**) or not entrusted the central bank alone(*); Overall index of economic
independence (being the sum of the asterisks in column 1-7). Source: Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini
(1991); Countries National Legislations; Table 4.1.
Variables Deterministic trend Lags ADF test Value Decision
DISR c 0 -1.428600 I(1)
∆ DISR none 0 -8.469777 I(0)
Real Output Gap none 5 -3.770167 I(0)
Inflation c 2 -3.364469 I(0)
GDP Growth c 4 -3.997588 I(0)
Residuals (Taylor-rule
equation) none 2 -2.564413 I(0)
Political Dummies none 0 -10.14889 I(0)
Table 4.7: Statistical Properties of the Variables: Unit Root Test Results.
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4.6 Graphical Representation of the Data Se-
ries
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Figure 4.4: SBP Discount Rate 1985-2010.
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Figure 4.5: Inflation 1985-2010.
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Figure 4.6: Real Output Gap 1985-2010.
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Figure 4.7: GDP Growth 1985-2010.
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Figure 4.8: OLS Estimation based residuals from (Taylor Rule) Equation.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Policy
Implications
This dissertation comprises of three distinct empirical research case studies
undertaken on economic voting and political business cycle theories. The
first study “Bread and the Attrition of Power: Economic Events and Ger-
man Election Results” has been carried out to study the voting behavior of
German voters during the post-war period 1953–2005. While the latter two
studies “Pakistan, Politics and Political Business Cycles” and “Pakistan
Central Bank Independence and Electoral Politics” have been conducted
to test the existence of the electoral politics and its implications on the
Pakistan economy. Although all three studies are based on the concept of
economic voting and its implications, however each of these has captured a
different aspects of two different economies of Germany and Pakistan.
The first study has investigated the German’s voting behavior during
1953–2005. Results show that German voters are well-informed of prevail-
ing economic conditions and they vote according to the national economic
situation during the whole election terms. We found that incumbents (coali-
tion of parties) that offer average growth during the term earns a vote share
of 47.96 percent and each additional percentage point of growth adds 1.98
percentage points to votes. Our results are in line with the Hibbs (2000,
2008) “Bread and Peace model” results for United States presidential elec-
tions. However, the effect on the vote share is smaller in case of Germany
than in the United States, arguably because the political systems are very
different or economic variables are not as important in Germany as in case
of United States. Therefore, the motivation to induce the political busi-
ness cycles in run-up to elections is very low, and politicians have to be
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concerned about the stable economic conditions during the whole election
term. In this scenario, one can understand the growing unpopularity of
the present German chancellor Angela Merkel’s Chirtian Democrates due
to economic crises started in 2009. Angela Merkel’s party and its Bavarian
sister (Christian Social Union) party have lost elections in Hamburg and in
the state of Baden-Wu¨erttemberg this year (2011) and face low approval
ratings during the last two years (2009-10). According to our results it is
the average growth of real disposable income of a German during the term
that fell sharply in 2009 due to economic crises and now growing at low
pace since then, actually dragging on Ms. Merkels popularity. Therefore if
the German government some how manage to deliver strong real per capita
disposable income growth, then it is likely that Ms. Merkel would be signif-
icantly more popular and have more political latitude to sign Germany up
for bailouts. Another important result that has been witnessed in the elec-
tions of 1961, 1994 and 1998 is the attrition of power effect. Accordingly, if
German chancellor is going to sought re-election thrice or more times then
his coalition parties vote share will be reduced due to the attrition of power
effect.
The second study “Pakistan, Politics and Political Business Cycles” has
been conducted to test the existence and identification of Political Busi-
ness Cycles in Pakistan Economy. This study is economically worthwhile
in terms of findings and useful policy implications. We found clear oppor-
tunistic cycles in unemployment and inflation during election window, as a
result of politically motivated employment schemes and artificially regulated
prices. These expansionary policies has caused an increase in the budget
deficit that is accommodated by the net government budgetary borrowings
and borrowing from the banking sector resulting in monetary expansion
and inflationary pressure in the economy simultaneously. In contrast, these
expansionary policies are unable to have a real positive effect on GDP and
investment growth during the same period, may be attributed to the resul-
tant inefficient allocation of resources. The root cause behind the existence
of such substantial electorally motivated policies in a developing economy
such as Pakistan is the politicians short-sighted vision, weak accountability
system, voters’s unawareness and inability to understand the interplay of
these types of opportunistic games. In order to control and overcome these
distortions there is a need to promote and encourage the knowledge-based
economy that would led to set-up awareness among the voters and develop
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proper accountability system via voting behavior.
The third study of this dissertation “Electoral Politics and Central Bank
Independence” has addressed another important aspect i.e. the miss-use of
the country’s monetary policy by the opportunistic politicians in order to
accomplish their short-term objectives. The monetary policy is usually
used due to its immediate effect and relatively easy access in comparison
to other financing options, however it may have severe implications after-
wards in terms of inflationary pressures, debt crises and sustainability issues.
Considering this problem seriously, significant reforms have been initiated
to strengthen and set-up the independent monetary institutions all over
the world. Also, in Pakistan the policy move towards the central bank in-
dependence has been started in the 1990s decade. Although it has been
witnessed that Pakistan Central bank (SBP) is still among the category of
least independent central banks, thus having the considerable probability of
political manipulation to exist during the election periods. In view of this
situation, we have estimated a central bank interest rate reaction (Taylor
Type) function with some political variables to investigate the existence of
PMCs in Pakistan during the period 1985Q1–2010Q4. The estimated inter-
est rate reaction function follows the conventional wisdom and demonstrates
the tightening of monetary policy by SBP whenever the output gap/GDP
growth and inflation rises in the economy. The pre-election dummy vari-
ables are found to be negative and significant, that support the existence of
electoral politics i.e. PMCs during the underlying period. These results has
conformity with the findings of Batool and Sieg (2009b) and Alpenda and
Honig (2009) who demonstrated the existence of electoral cycles in mone-
tary policy and PMCs existence attributed to the non-independence of the
central banks of developing countries.
Comparing these three studies we found that Germany and Pakistan are
two different economies in terms of voters behavior, political system, stage
of economic and political development, institutions structures and there-
fore having different resultant implications of economic voting and political
business cycles. German voters are well-informed, more democratic and
matured. Like Americans, their voting decision is based on the economic
performance demonstrated by the incumbents during the whole election
term. Moreover, German politicians are also aware of the fact that voters
do respond by voting against them if they found to be involved in such types
of opportunistic games. Therefore they have less motivations to induce the
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political business cycles in run-up to elections and more concerned about
the stable economic situation during the whole election term. In contrast,
Pakistan is a developing country where voters are naive and institutions (e.g
central banks) are less powerful than government. These conditions put the
politicians at great advantage to make use of the electoral politics and to
induce political business cycles in the run-up to elections. In my view, im-
portant factor behind these two extremes is the different stages of political
and economic development. Economic development and political develop-
ment are two interdependent things that comes together. Germany is a
developed knowledge based-economy, strong political and economic institu-
tions set-ups and people are well-informed, hence having the better ability
in making economic and political decisions. Therefore the person (either
voter or incumbent) who make wrong choice is out of the game. While
Pakistan is at the developing stage in terms of economics and politics as
well, thus provide a room for political manipulation to exist. Therefore in
Pakistan we have witnessed various employment schemes, ad-hoc salary re-
liefs, subsidies, crop-support prices and regulatory control on energy prices
to control inflation artificially till the election period are the common ex-
amples of political manipulation before election. Another important factor
that contributes to the existence of political business cycles in a developing
country such as Pakistan is its weak institutional set-ups. For example, the
monetary authority, German Bundas Bank (before currency union), and
now the European Central Bank is one of the leading independent central
banks that had tolerated successfully the immense pressure from govern-
ment and other member countries and made possible the functioning of
single currency in Euro-Zone19. On the other hand, Pakistan central bank
is still infant on the path of independence and resultantly its management
and monetary policies have been victimized many a times by the electoral
politics. In view of these hard underlying facts, one can fully understand
the recent resignation of Pakistan’s central bank governor (Dr. Shahid Kar-
dar) from his duties before the completion of his term. It provides a clear
evidence of the central bank’s inability to tolerate the political pressure
from the government authorities during the present government tenure. In
short, the lesson drawn from these research studies is that there is a need
to develop and set-up the knowledge-based economy, proper accountabil-
19However; presently there is a controversy going on Greece and ECB role, but ECB
is still one of the independent central bank.
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ity system, strong and independent institutional set-ups to foster the real
economic and political development in a country such as Pakistan.
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